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Missouri Law Review
Volume IX JUNE, 1944 Number 3
FIFTY YEARS OF THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALSt
EVAN A. EVANs*
The Constitution of the United States vests the judicial power of the
federal government in a Supreme Court and ". . . such inferior courts
as congress shall ordain and establish,"' and provides that the judicial
power shall extend to enumerated situationS,2 over some of which the
tThis article constitutes the first chapter of a projected volume on the work
of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal.
The author wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to the writers who have
preceded him in the field of the history of the federal judiciary, particularly Mr.
Charles Warren, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, and Dean Landis. The influence of
their research is evident in this article. Acknowledgment is also made of the kind-
ness of Professor Henry Hart of the Harvard Law School, whose class in Federal
Jurisdiction prepared term papers on the various topics embraced in the proposed
book and which were made available to me. Finally the entire manuscript has
been read and edited by Professor Orrin B. Evans of the Law School of the Uni-
versity of Missouri.
*Senior Judge, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit B.A.
University of Wisconsin, 1897; LL.B. 1899; LL.D. 1933.
1. U. S. Constitution, Article III, § 1.
2. U. S. Constitution, Article III, § 2 reads, "The judicial power shall ex-
tend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of
the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under their authority;
to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United
States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a
State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between
citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and
between a State or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or subjects.
"In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall
have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and
under such regulations as the Congress shall make.
"The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury;
and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been
committed; but 'when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such
place or places as the Congress may by law have directed."
(189)
1
Evans: Evans: Fifty Years of the United States Circuit
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction and over others, appellate
jurisdiction only.3 Mr. Justice Story once plausibly argued 4 that a mandate
was thus given to congress to establish a system of federal courts in which
would be vested nisi prius jurisdiction over all the situations to which fed-
eral judicial power could extend (excepting those of which such jurisdiction
was laid in the Supreme Court), so that the Supreme Court might exercise
its constitutional appellate jurisdiction in every aspect. Although he spoke
for the Court on that occasion, his thesis has had little influence in subse-
quent legislation or litigation concerning the federal judicial system, having
been more disregarded than refuted. It is now well established that the
creation of inferior federal courts is discretionary with congress, which may
abolish" them altogether or impose such limitations on their jurisdiction as
it deems advisable, though as a result, the federal constitutional jurisdiction
may not be fully exercised.5 It is therefore the congressional statutes which
must be searched for the organization and jurisdiction of the federal courts.
The famed Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789,a has been justly
eulogized.6 It is generally recognized today that the judicial branch of the
national government has been largely responsible for the successful integra-
tion of dual sovereignties over the same territory. Oliver Ellsworth7 had no
precedent for such an institution in a federal system, and in the controversy
over his bill, it was rightly asserted that it would preserve the Federalist
3. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction "... in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall
be a party. ... In all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with 'such exceptions and under
such regulations as the Congress shall make." Art. III., § 2.
4. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816).
5. Among many, see Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. 441 (U. S. 1849); Kline v.
Burke Construction Company, 260 U. S. 226, 43 Sup. Ct. 79 (1922), 24 A. L. R.
1077, 1084 (1923). There are many illustrations of this principle. Perhaps the
one most frequently encountered is the limitation of district court jurisdiction
to cases wheie the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $3,000, ifjurisdiction is otherwise based on diversity of citizenship or the presence of a
"federal question." The Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act, limiting federal
jurisdiction over labor disputes, is another instance of the same doctrine, of great
significance during the past decade. See Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U. S.
323 58 Sup. Ct. 578 (1938).
5a. 1 STAT. 73 (1789).
6. See 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1923)
11, 12; Trieber, The New Federal Jidicial Code (1912) 46 Am. L. REv., 702, 703,
712. See also, note 10, infra.
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(and Hamiltonian) philosophy of a national union," a prediction quickly
realized in the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia.
The Act of 1789 stood unchanged in its basic conception until 1891, and
remains today the foundation of our federal judicial system.,10 The circuit
courts of appeals represent the only major alteration in court organization.
The first federal court system was composed of a supreme court, con-
sisting of a chief justice and five associate justices; three circuit courts, each
composed of two justices of the Supreme Court and a district judge; and
thirteen district courts, over each of which presided a single district judge.
The original eleven statesl~a each constituted a federal judicial district, save
that Massachusetts and Virginia were both divided into two districts."
The districts were in turn grouped into three circuits.
The very limited jurisdiction of the district courts was exclusively pri-
mary.12 Review was exclusively by the circuit courts.1  Jurisdiction of the
8. See 1 WARREN, Op. cit. supra note 6 at 16, 18.
9. 6 Wheat 264, (U. S. 1821).
10. It would be erroneous to suppose that because the original judiciary act
proved itself a bold, ingenious and successful solution of the problem of the judi-
ciary in a federal government dedicated both to a- tri-partite division of powers
within the national sovereignty and to the preservation of concurrent national
and state sovereignties, it was a perfect statute. The administration of justice
has seldom been more handicapped than by the awkwardness of procedures, uncer-
tainties of controlling precedent, and arbitrary limitations of jurisdiction exist-
ing in certain periods of the history of the federal courts. It was nearly a hundred
and fifty years before the separation of law and equity was overcome and the
Conformity Act (usually referred to as of 1872 but in origin dating to 1791)
effectually superseded. We are still struggling with the implications of the Rules
of Decision Act of the same date. And as to certain aspects of the law of federaljurisdiction, a learned judge has remarked, "It would be euphemy to call it chaos."
10a. Rhode Island and North Carolina had not then ratified the Constitution.
11. With one negligible exception, federal judicial districts have never ex-
tended across state boundaries. See FRANKFURTER AND'LANDIs, THE WORK OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1928) 11, n. 25.
12. The United States Supreme Court is the only constitutional federal
court. The other federal courts are denominated in the Constitution as "inferior"'
courts. They are, however, courts of general, rather than special, jurisdiction.
In the absence of any particular restraint imposed by Congress, they may enter-
tain any justiciable controversy within the broad jurisdiction conferred upon them
as'federal courts.
On the other hand, because of the dual character of our government it was
thought desirable that national courts should duplicate the work of the state
courts; The Constitution delimits the scope of federal judicial power and Con-
gress has restricted it even further, roughly to situations where the right sought
to be protected is derived from the national government or where the character
of the parties suggests that a state court may not be in a position to render im-
partial or effective justice The problems arising from the peculiar jurisdiction of
federal courts-most acute in the district courts-have been the subject of num-
erous excellent treatises. Iqter alia, see DomE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRO-
CEDURE (1928); BUNN, JURISDICTION AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES (4th" ed. 1939). Legislation relative to these issues is omitted from the
present work, except as it directly affects the circuit courts of appeals.
13. 1 STAT. 83 (1789).
19441
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circuit courts was partially appellate, as just stated. It was also original in
many situations, and for a considerable time by far the larger part of the
,isi prius jurisdiction of the federal courts was exercised by the circuit
courts, the district judges being chiefly occupied in preparing for trial the
cases in which they would sit, with the two Supreme Court justices riding
that circuit, as circuit judges. Of certain cases the nisi prius jurisdiction of
,the district and circuit courts was respectively exclusive, but in others it
was concurrent.14
The Supreme Court was vested with limited original jurisdiction by the
Constitution and statute.'s It had appellate jurisdiction of two types:
14. The district courts had original criminal jurisdiction of offenses com-
mitted on the high seas or within the particular district, where the penalty did not
exceed a fine of more than one hundred dollars, imprisonment of more than a
year, or whipping of more than thirty stripes. (It will be recalled that as there
are no common law offenses against the United States, criminal jurisdiction of all
federal courts is limited to violation of express statute). Act of Sept. 24, 1789,
c. 20, § 9. (1 STAT. 76). The circuit courts had concurrent jurisdiction of such
crimes and exclusive jurisdiction of all other offenses cognizable under the laws
of the United States. Ibid. at § 11 (1 STAT. 78). The state courts have no con-
current criminal jurisdiction.
The district courts had exclusive original jurisdiction of all causes in admiralty
and maritime law, and "of all seizures on land, or other waters than as aforesaid,
made, and of all suits for penalties and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of
the United States." Concurrently with the circuit courts, the district courts had
cognizance (1) of causes where an alien sues for tort based on violation of inter-
national law or United States treaty, (2) of suits by the United States where
the matter in dispute amounted to $100 exclusive of costs, and (3) of suits-against
consuls and vice-consuls. Ibid at § 9 (1 STAT. 76). The state courts had concur-
rent jurisdiction of the first and second classes. The district courts of Maine and
Kentucky had somewhat broader jurisdiction. Ibid. § 10 (1 STAT. 77).
The circuit courts had jurisdiction concurrent with the state courts, "of all suits
of a civil nature at common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute ex-
ceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United
States are plaintiffs or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a
citizen of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State. Ibid.
§ 11 (1 STAT. § 78).
15. 1 STAT. 80 (1789). "And be it further enacted, That the Supreme Court
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state
is a party, except between a state and its citizens; and except also between a
state and citizens of other states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have orig-
inal but not exclusive jurisdiction. (b.) And shall have exclusively all such juris-
diction of suits or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or
their domestics, or domestic servants, as a court of law can have or exercise con-
sistently with the law of nations; and original, but not exclusive jurisdiction of
all suits brought by ambassadors, or other public ministers, or in which a consul,
or vice consul, shall be a party. (a) And the trial of issues in fact in the Supreme
Court, in all actions at law against citizens of the United States, shall be by jury.
Tdhe Supreme Court shall also have appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts
and courts of the several states in the cases herein after specially provided for;
[Vol, 9
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1944], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss3/1
1944] U. S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS 193
(a) from the circuit courts, whether the judgment to be reviewed was original
or itself appellate; (b) from state courts of last resort.' 6  I
All the elements of the modern federal court organization were thereY
Marked as may seem the changes, they are essentially matters of emphasis,
dictated by a constant theme-relief of the Supreme Court-for the early
court structure lacked the elasticity necessary for the demands on the
judiciary arising from territorial expansion. The focal point of this deficiency
was the fact that ". . . three tiers of courts were operated by two sets
of judges. The whole system pivoted on circuit riding by the justices.' '1 s
As the country grew larger, more circuits were created.-9 This meant either
more circuit riding by the justices, or an increased number of justices, or
both. The last proved to be the case.20
Instead of appointing regular circuit judges to handle the work of the
circuit court, congress met each emergency resulting from the increased tasks
of the expanding federal judicial power with mere palliatives. In 1793 an
(b) and shall have power to issue writs of prohibition (c) to the district courts,
when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and writs of
mandamus, (d) in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law, to any
courts appointed, or persons holding office, under the authority of the United States."
16. Section 25 of this Act (1 STAT. 85 (1789)) provided, "That a final judg-
ment or decree in any suit, in the highest court of law or equity of a State in
which a decision in the suit could be had, where is drawn in question the validity
of a treaty or statute of, or an authority exercised under the United States, and
the decision is against their validity; or where is drawn in question the validity
of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on the ground of their
being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and
the decision is in favour of such their validity, (d) or where is drawn in question
the construction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or
commission held under the United States, and the decision is against the title,
right, privilege or exemption specially set up or claimed by either party, under
such clause of the said Constitution, treaty, statute or commission, may be re-
examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States
upon a writ of error.....
17. The constant characteristic of the three tiers of courts is easily discerned.
The Supreme Court justices no longer ride the circuits, but on rare occasions do
sit with the circuit courts of appeals and upon his retirement from active duty on
the Supreme Court, Justice Van Devanter on one occasion sat in a federal dis-
trict court in New York. In the heterogeneous "three judge" district courts, of
which one judge is a circuit judge, and from which appeal lies directly to the
Supreme Court, may be found the ghost of the nisi prius function of the old cir-
cuit courts.
18. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 11 at 14.
19. 2 STAT. 90, divided the country into six circuits. In 1807 an additional
circuit was created (2 STAT. 420) and in 1837 the number was increased to nine
(5 STAT. 176). In 1929 (45 STAT. 1346) the tenth-and last-circuit was created.
20. As each new circuit was created an additional justice was appointed to
the Supreme Court. See the statutes cited in footnote 19 supra.
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amendment to the Judiciary Act provided that the circuit courts should
consist of only one Supreme Court justice and one district judge; 2' and
thereafter, the justices took the circuits in turn, instead of being confined
to fixed circuits. The genuine remedy which the notorious "Midnight
judges" Act of February 13, 180122 afforded in creating sixteen circuit
judgeships, three judges for each of the first five circuits and one for the
sixth circuit, was labeled a piece of "stupendous jobbery" and became "part
and parcel of a fierce party strife. ' 23 There is no doubt but what it was
the dying effort of the Federalists to prolong their domination of the govern-
ment, but it would have entirely eliminated circuit riding by Supreme Court
justices and would have answered the judicial needs of the time.
Following the sweeping victory of the Jeffersonian Party at the polls
in 1801, came the inevitable repeal of this Act.2 4 The courts returned to
the old system of circuit riding but congress did allow the circuit court
to be held by a single judge. With the growth of the country, the latter
provision became the custom rather than the exception, since it was "... . im-
possible for the Justices to attend circuit in all the districts at all sessions,
and the circuit courts devolved more and more into the hands of single
district judges.126
As a new circuit was created, a new justice was added to the Supreme
Court, the lack of correlation between the needs of the circuit courts and
most efficient size of the Supreme Court notwithstanding. In 1807 an addi-
tional circuit was created and another justice appointed.21 In 1837 the
number of each was increased to nine.28 But these measures were insufficient
and in a few years the Supreme Court was seriously in arrears29 and the
21. 1 STAT. 333 (1793).
22. 2 STAT. 89 (1801).
23. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, Op. Cit. s'upra note 11 at 21, et seq.
24. 2 STAT. 132 (1802).
25. 2 STAT. 156 (1802).
26. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, op. cit. supra note 11 at 32.
27. 2 STAT. 420 (1807).
28. 5 STAT. 176 (1837).
29. This growing arrearage is best illustrated by the figures contained in SEN.
Doc. No. 91, 29th Cong., 1st Sess. 473:
Term Cases Pending Cases Disposed of
1841 .......................................................  106 42
1842 ................ ..................................... 107 52
1843 ....... ....................................................... 118 36
1844 ................................................................. 168 46
1845 .............................................................. 173 64
[Vol. 9
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chore of circuit riding became impossible.30 By the Act of June 17, 1844,3-
a month was added to the Court's session and the Justices were relieved
from attending ". . more than one term of the circuit court within any
district of said circuit in any one year ...
The steady growth of business before the Supreme Court3- forced it
to adopt, for the first time, a rule limiting argument, to two hours a side.34
These therapeutics were of scant aid. The impending struggle over the
slavery question so engulfed congress that the already belated judicial re-
form was relegated to the shelf until after the Civil War. However, the Act
of March 2, 1855,'- enacted to meet the pressing needs of the newly created
state of California,36 by constituting it a circuit with a separate circuit
judge, but leaving the general system untouched, presaged the ultimate
divorce of the circuit courts from the Supreme Court.
The new national consciousness engendered by the Civil War, plus an in-
tense stimulation of economic and industrial activity tending toward nation-
wide corporate structures, necessitated the extension of federal activities,
and, consequently, of the jurisdiction of the federal courts.3 7 Moreover,
30. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIs, op. cit. supra note 11 at 49 et seq. for a
summary of the miles travelled by the justices in riding circuit. In 1838, Justice.
McKinley reported that he covered 10,000 miles doing circuit duty in the ninth
circuit, then composed of Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and Arkansas. SEN.
Doc. No. 50, 25th Cong., 3rd Sess., 339. That the justices found the burden of riding
the circuits most onerous from the very beginning of the court is evidenced by the
representations of Chief Justice Jay and his associates to President Washington:
"We really, sir, find the burdens laid upon us so excessive that we cannot
forbear representing them in strong and explicit terms. ... That the task of
holding twenty-seven Circuit Courts a year, in the different States, from New
Hampshire to Georgia, besides two sessions of thd Supreme Court at Philadel-
phia, in the two most severe seasons of the year, is a task which, considering the
extent of the United States and the small number of Judges is too burdensome."
1 AM. STATE PAPERS, Misc., 52.
31. 5 STAT. 676 (1844).
32. Ibid.
33. In 1840, 92 cases were docketed; in 1850 the number had increased to 253,
and in 1860, to 310. See remarks of Senator Davis in the Senate on May 1 (1882)
13 CONG. REc. 3464.
34. Rule of Court No. 53, 7 How. (U. S. 1849), Wayne and Woodbury,
JJ., dissenting.
35. 10 STAT. 631 (1855).
36. 9 STAT. 452 (1850).
37. See Trumbull, The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (1892) 16 ILL.
S. B. A. REP. 64. Trumbull was a former member of the Illinois State Supreme
Court and had been a leader in the senate during the period preceding the creation
of the circuit court of appeals.
1944]
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the courts, by liberal construction, were steadily assuming authority over
cases theretofore left to the state courts."8
These factors, plu increased population, the settlement of western
lands, and the chaotic events of the post-war era, pressed demands for sub-
stantial changes in the overburdened federal judicial system." And they
38. "'Till 1850, the calendar of the Supreme Court did not average 140 cases
a term: for the last term it exceeded 1,500. This vast increase in the business of
the Supreme Court is partly due to the growth of the population and business of
the country, but chiefly to the legislation of Congress, conferring additional juris-
diction upon the District and Circuit Courts, and the disposition of the Federal
Court by construction to amplify their powers. . . .Thus by legislation and judicial
construction there have been drawn into the Federal Courts a class of cases between
citizens of the same State never contemplated by the constitution (referring to the
increased right of removal from state courts). It was originally held by the Supreme
Court, that a corporation was not a citizen, and where the jurisdiction was founded
only on the diverse citizenship of parties, the capacity of a corporation to sue or be
sued in a Federal Court, depended upon the citizenship of its members. (See Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61, (U. S. 1809)). This was the law in
the days of Marshall. But by later decisions it has been held, that a corporation
and its members are to be conclusively presumed to, be citizens of the State by
which the corporation is incorporated. (See Louisville C. & C. R. R. v. Letson, 2
How. 497, (U. S. 1844) and Ohio & Miss. R. R. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286 (U. S.
1861)) and a large part of the time of the federal courts has, of late years, been
taken up in considering cases to which corporations were parties, without regard
to the citizenship of its members of the corporations, and of which they would have
had no jurisdiction in Marshall's day.
"The business of the Federal Courts was also largely increased by cases grow-
ing -out of the War of the Rebellion. Upon the abolition of, slavery by the 13th
Amendment to the Constitution, various Acts were passed by Congress to protect
the freedmen in their civil rights, and the Federal Courts were given jurisdiction of
cases arising under these acts. All of these causes combined, and particularly the
act of 1875, so increased the business of the Federal Courts that the Supreme Court
found itself unable during the term to dispose of the cases brought before it, and
they continued to pile up, so that for the last half dozen years a case upon its
calendar was seldom reached under three years from the time it was filed." Id.
at 65, 66 (parenthetical matter supplied "By judicial decision is had been de-
cided that all actions by or against corporations created by an act of Congress are
actions which arise under the laws of the United States, and were therefore within
the jurisdiction of the district court because of their subject-matter; this regard-
less of whether the case actually involved the construction or effect of an act of
Congress. See Osborn v. Bank of United States, 9 Wheat. 738, (U. S. 1824); Pacific
Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 5 Sup. Ct 1113 (1884). This jurisdiction
was taken away as regards national banks by Section 4, Act of March 3, 1887, 24
STAT. 554; as regards railroad companies chartered by Congress by the Act of
January 28, 1915, 38 STAT. 804, and the Act of Congress of February 13, 1925, 43
STAT. 941 28 U. S. C. § 42 (1940) stripped the federal courts of all jurisdiction
based on federal incorporation save where the United States owns over one-half
of the corporation's stock.
39. The underlying forces which demanded change in our judicial system are
well summarized by Martin T. Manton, former senior judge of the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a paper on the organization of
work of the courts of appeal.
[Vol. 9
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were-not long in coming. Had the old "Republicans" been present during
this post-war era of reform they could have pointed to their prophetic
remonstrances of 1801 and uttered a righteous "I told you so." A flood of
litigation poured into the nisi prius courts, 40 and the Supreme Court's docket
of cases pending soon reflected this ever-growing torrent. Where in 1850
only 253 cases were pending before the Supreme Court, and in 1860, only
310, the Court had 636 cases on its 1870 docket.41 The record of the next
twenty years was one of constant and intolerable increase.
Growing agitation against the absolute power of the single district
judge who for all practical purposes was also a circuit judge,42 coupled with
the necessity of relieving the Supreme Court of its burden of circuit riding,
resulted in the passage of the Act of April 10, 1869, which provided for the
appointment of a circuit judge for each of the nine circuits. 43 This act
"The history of the national courts indicates that the Federal judiciary system
has changed of necessity as its business has grown. ... Many changes have been re-
quired with the growth of population and the progress of the country. As we have
grown the public demand has been for a more centralized Federal control. That
brought forth, as of necessity, Federal legislation to meet the requirements of the
administration of justice after such control. New laws created new commissions and
other agencies of the national government. Regulatory enactments to guide and
control these new congressional creations were-necessary. The regulation of inter-
state commerce, foodstuffs, railroads and other public utilities, foreign commerce,
immigration and matters of maritime transportation has led to varied tribunals
for solution." Manton, Organization and Work of the U. S. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals (1926) 12, A. B. A. J. 41.
40. In 1873, the total number of cases pending in the district and circuits was
29,013, of which 5,108 were bankruptcy cases. By 1880, the repeal of the Bank-
ruptcy Act notwithstanding, the number had increased to 38,045. A total of 54,194
was reached in 1890. (These figures are taken from the Reports of the Attorney-
General for the years mentioned.)
41. Senator Davis in the Senate on May 1, 1882, 13 CONG. REc. 3464.
42. "The original distinction between the District and Circuit courts is now
practically obsolete. In most of the federal districts nearly all of the work in the
circuit courts is done by the district judges." Pierce, Relief for the Federal Courts
(1881) 7 So. L. REV. (N.S.) 884, 887. See also the United States Courts and the
New Court Bill (1876) 10 AM. L. REv. 398, 406 et seq. Hill The Federal Judicial
System (1889) 12 A. B. A. REP. 289, 304, and see McCrary, Needs of the Federal
Judiciary (1881) 13 CENT. L. J. 167, pointing out that the district judges accumu-
lated intense disfavor because over two-thirds of the circuit court work was handled
by the single district judges whose decisions were final in many cases. This situa-
tion was particularly obnoxious in criminal cases because the Supreme Court had
no jurisdiction of a writ of error from a circuit court in a criminal case. United
States v. More, 3 Cranch 159 (U. S. 1805). It was not until 1889 that review was
allowed in a capital case (Act of February 6, 1889, 25 STAT. 656) and not until
1891 was this review extended to "other infamous crimes." 26 STAT. 827 (1891).
43. 16 STAT. 44 (1869). These newly appointed circuit judges soon came in
for their share of criticism and a writer, in The Nation, said that "the greatest
despot of the land is the United States circuit judge." 32 NATION 9.
19441
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proved a temporary aid at best, however, since the performance of circuit
duties by the Supreme Court justices had become more theory than fact and
was no longer a very substantial portion of the judicial burden of the court,
and any relief accorded by elimination of the wisi prius activities of its
members was soon overbalanced by the sweeping provisions of the Act of
March 3, 1875, 4 by which "... Congress gave the federal courts the vast
range of power which had lain dormant in the Constitution since 1789."1
In fact, the federal courts were given jurisdiction over all cases involving
the constitution, a federal law, agency or treaty, and, by removal, over all
such cases brought originally in a state court. The ever-increasing diversity
of citizenship cases was multiplied by the developing doctrine of corporate
citizenship. 46 Furthermore, the post-war amendments to the Constitution,
notably the Fourteenth, added greatly to the work of the federal courts.
4
Although proposals for an intermediate appellate court had emerged
as early as 1848,4 8 again in 1854,49 and another in 1865, ° they were ad-
mittedly premature. These early bills provided, basically, for either con-
current jurisdiction between the circuit and district courts or for the elim-
ination of one or the other; and for intermediate tribunals composed of one
Supreme Court justice and two or more district judges.r ' Instead of taking
measures striking at the core of the problem, congress vacillated, and from
time to time during the years between 1865 and 1891 added more judges12
44. 18 STAT. 470 (1875).
45. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIs, THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) 65.
46. See footnote 38, supra.
47. That the Supreme Court realized this fact is borne out in the following
quotation from Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 104 (1877). "In fact, it
would seem, from the character of many of the cases before us, and the arguments
made in them, that the clause under consideration is looked upon as a means of
bringing to the test of the decision of this court the abstract opinions of every
unsuccessful litigant in a State court of the justice of the decision against him, and,
of the merits of the legislation on which such a decision may be founded." See also
Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 520, 6 Sup. Ct. 110, 112 (1885).
48. 18 CONG. GLOBE 398-399.
49. 33 id. at 924, 1210.
50. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1865) 292. See also id. at 275, 915,
and 1338. Lyman Trumbull, in introducing his bill, stated: "I desire to say that
I introduce it with the view of bringing the subject before the Senate and the
country. ... The amount of business accumulating in the Supreme Court amounts
almost to a denial of justice and some legislation is necessary, and will become
more necessary as the business accumulates in that court, to relieve it."
51. It is to be remembered that no circuit judges, as such, existed prior to
1869.
52. Besides the addition of numerous district judges from time to time, the
Act of April 10, 1869, 16 STAT. 44, created nine circuit judgeships.
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to the outmoded system, limited review in admiralty and patent cases, 53 in-
creased the money value requisite to appeals from $2,000 to $5,000,54 de-
bated bills devised to eliminate corporate citizenship as a means of access
to the federal courts,55 increased the jurisdictional amount from $500 to
$2,000,"' limited the right of an assignee of negotiable paper to sue to only
those cases where the original holder could have sued,57 subjected national
banks to the jurisdiction of state courts,58 and burdened the district and
circuit courts with concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims" in
cases where the amount exceeded $1,000 and did not exceed $10,000.60
Reorganization of the federal judiciary had more at stake than mere
administrative reform. There was involved the fundamental issue of the
purpose which the federal courts should serve. Eastern capital was locked
in fierce sectional strife with western and southern agrarianism. It was a
new phase of the century-old struggle between the states and the federal
government, and the record of the federal courts had, demonstrated both
their inevitable alignment with a nationalistic philosophy and their greater
remoteness from popular sectional social movements. More than thirty
bills were introduced in the House and/or Senate in the fifteen-year interim
between 1875 and 1890 providing for some sort of an intermediate court of
appeals."' Several bills sought a solution of the problem by creating addi-
tional Supreme Court justices;62 one would have had an'enlarged Supreme
Court sitting in divisions; 63 some suggested relief by terminating the already
theoretical circuit duties of the justices.64 Not promoted by special interest
53. 18 STAT. 315 (1875), 28 U. S. C. 771 (1940).
54. Id. at 316.
55. These bills and the debates on them are fully covered in FRANKFURTER
AND LANDIS, THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) 89, 90.
56. 24 STAT. 552 (1887).
57. Id. at 553.
58. Id. at 554 § 4, providing that national banks shall be "... deemed citi-
zens of the States in which they are respectively located .... "
59. See p. 213, infra, for a discussion of the Court of Claims.
60. 24 STAT. 505 (1887) (Commonly known as the Tucker Act) See foot-
note 56, supra.
61. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928)
70-98. These bills were critically analyzed by a contemporary writer, Dickerman,
The Business of the Federal Courts, and the Salaries of the Judges, (1890) Am. L.
REv. 78. See also Raymond, Relief of the Federal Courts' Docket (1889) ILL. S.
BAR ASS'N. REP. 65.
62. See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928)
74, 80. These proposals are critically discussed by Pierce, Relief for the Federal
Courts (1881) 7 So. L. REv. (N.s.) 884.
63. 10 CONG. REc. 528.
64. 11 id. at 810.
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or by any particular politically influential group, all failed of passage by
indecisive and inert congresses, the more incapable of creative legislation
by reason of the lack of political unanimity among House of Representatives,'
Senate and presidency from 1875 to 1890.64a
While Congress "fiddled" the Supreme Court "burned. '5 4b The Oc-
tober term of 1884 opened with 1315 cases; the following year brought the
total to 1340; the 1886 term increased it to 1396; in 1887 there were 1427;
in 1888, 1563; in 1889, 1635; and in 1890 the unbelievable total of 1816 was
reached. 65 Finally, on April 7, 1890, the House Committee on Judiciary
reported favorably upon a bill introduced by John H. Rogers." It pro-
vided for one isi prius court, abolishing the old circuit court. It created
nine intermediate courts of appeal with final decision in cases arising solely
through diversity' of citizenship, reserving a right of -certification; two addi-
64a. The animosity between President Andrew Johnson and Congress was
undoubtedly a potent factor in postponing judicial reorganization immediately
following the Civil War. This disagreement over patronage is said to be one of
the reasons why Senator McCrary's bill of 1876 for the creation of an intermedi-
ate court of appeals did not provide for the appointment of any new judges (See
(1876) 10 AM. L. REV. 398), the author noting that "There are worse evils in the
administration of justice than delay." See also Hill, The Federal Judicial System,
(1889) 12 A. B. A. REP. 289, 320, 321; Budd, The United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals (1893) 9 L. Q. REv. 51, 56.
64b. The statement, obviously figurative, is descriptive in two senses. Not
only was the court in danger of disintegration from the excessive burden, but also
the justices were impatiently asking for legislative relief. Chief Justice Waite, a
few months before his death in 1887, said in an address:
"The law which fixes at this time the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court was enacted substantially in its present form at the first session of Congress,
nearly 100 years ago. With few exceptions, and these for all practical purposes
unimportant to the point I wish to make, the jurisdiction remains today as it was
at first, and consequently with a population in the United States approaching
60,000,000 and a territory embracing nearly 3,000,000 square miles, the Supreme
Court has appellate jurisdiction in all of the classes of cases it had when the pop-
ulation was less than 4,000,000 and the territory but little more than 800,000
square miles. Under such circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the annual
docket of the court has increased from 100 cases or perhaps a little more, half
a century ago, to nearly 1,400, and that its business is now more than three years
and a half behind. ... In the face of such facts it cannot admit of a doubt that
something should be done, and that at once, for relief against this oppressive wrong."
See also Mr. Justice Miller's opinion on the need for reform, with suggested
remedies, in the January, 1872, number of the UNITED STATES JURIST, quoted and
discussed by a contemporary writer in Note (1872) 5 ALB. L. J. 22. See also the
May, 1811, issue of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for an article by Mr. Justice
Strong; Mr. Justice Harlan, The United States Supreme Court, (1881) 20 CHI.
LEG. NEws 208 and Mr. Justice Field, The Centenary of the Supreme Court of the
United States (1890) 24 AM. L. REv. 351.
65. These figures are obtained from the REP. ATr'Y. GEN., (1885 to 1891).
66. 21 CONG. REc. 3049, 3130.
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tional circuit judges were to be appointed for each circuit, making a total of
three for each circuit, thereby relieving the justices from circuit duty.67
After critics had argued that the circuit courts should not be disturbed
and that nine separate appellate tribunals would bring uncertainty and
chaos into the federal judicial system,68 the bill passed the House by the
decisive vote of 131 to 13.69 The Senate Judiciary Committee, William M.
Evarts, chairman, recommended a substitute for the House bill which made
several important changes.7 0 Evarts retained the central proposal of nine
courts of appeal, but clung to the traditional district and circuit court sys-
tem, abolishing only the appellate jurisdiction of the latter. His bill pro-
vided for a direct appeal from the district courts and the circuit courts to
the Supreme Court in certain limited situations,71 requiring that all other
litigation be appealed to the new circuit courts of appeals. No jurisdictional
amount was required. In diversity of citizenship cases, and in cases involving
the patent, revenue, criminal and admiralty laws, the decisions of the latter
67. The bill is set forth in 21 CONG. REc. 3402.
68. Id. at 3043 to 3407.
69. Id. at 3410.
70. Id. at 10218. Senator Evart's bill, except for minor modifications in word-
ing, an amendment allowing a direct appeal to the Supreme Court in the case of
capital and "other infamous crimes," and a provision for appeals from the United
States Court in the Indian Territory and from the courts of the other territories,
became law in the Act of March 3, 1891, 26 STAT. 826 (1891).
71. Section 5 of the act as finally passed provided for direct appeal to the
Supreme Court without limitation of jurisdiction amount,
(1) "In any case in which the jurisdiction of the court is in issue; in such
cases the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the Supreme Court
from the court below for decision." [Tle appeal could not be taken prior to final
judgment, nor could the same party appeal to the Supreme Court on the issue
of jurisdiction and to the circuit court of appeals on the merits, McLish v. Roff,
141 U .S. 661, 12 Sup. Ct. 118'(1891); an appeal to the circuit court of appeals
by one party was suspended during appeal to the Supreme Court on question of
jurisdiction by his opponent, Barling v. Bank of British North America, 50 Fed.
260 (C. C. A. 9th, 1892); and, of course, though the appeal were made to the cir-
cuit court of appeals by either party on the merits of the case, it remained the
duty of that court on its own initiative to consider the question of jurisdiction
and to remand with directions to dismiss if jurisdiction did not appear on the
record, Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U. S. 379, 4 Sup. Ct. 510 (1884);
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Willard, 220 U. S. 413, 31 Sup. Ct. 460 (1911)].
(2) "From the final sentences and decrees in prize cases."
(3) "In cases of conviction of a capital or otherwise infamous crime."
(4) "In any case that involved the construction or application of the Consti-
tution of the United States."
(5) "In any case in which the constitutonality of any law of the United
States, or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority,
is drawn in question."
(6) "In any case in which the constitution or law of a State is claimed to be
in contravention of the Constitution of the United States."
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were to be final, subject to certiorari2 or certification. In other cases a right
of appeal from the circuit court of appeals to the Supreme Court lay where
the matter in controversy exceeded one thousand dollars, if taken within
one year from entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed. This
bill added only one additional circuit judge to the one already provided for
each circuit. The justices of the Supreme Court, the two circuit judges, and
the judges of the district courts of the circuit were competent to sit upon
the circuit court of appeals. While it was contemplated that it should be
a three judge court, two judges would constitute a quorum.7 2a
72. Thus, in this numerically important portion of federal litigation, where
national law is not intrinsically involved, the Supreme Court in its discretion could
limit the number of cases to come before it. The device proved so efficacious and
generally satisfactory that it formed the basis of most of the subsequent legislation
affecting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, notably the Judges Bill of 1925
in connection with which the theory and practise is discussed, infra.
The right of the circuit courts of appeals to certify questions to the Supreme
Court has also been preserved and is discussed infra. The attitude of the Supreme
Court has not encouraged the use of this technique and, as will be seen, it is spar-
ingly resorted to.
72a. Only the essential outline of the court organization is here depicted. The
bill contained numerous other provisions necessary for the vitalization and func-
tioning of the new courts. The then existing appellate practice governing appeals,
writs of error, supersedeas and costs was made applicable to the new circuit courts
of appeals. These courts were also granted the power to prescribe the form and
style of their seals, writs and other process, to fix their terms of court, to issue
extraordinary writs "... necessary for the exercise of their... jurisdiction, and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law," and "to establish all necessary
rules and regulations for the conduct of the business of the court within its juris-
diction as conferred by law." The act provided that both the Supreme Court and
the circuit courts of appeals after reviewing a case on appeal, should remand the
same to the district or circuit court, as the case might be ".. . for further pro-
ceedings to be there taken in pursuance of such determination."
The provisions of the act were expressly made applicable to appeals from the
United States court in the Indian Territory, such appeals going to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit Appeals from the territorial courts were
-to be reviewed by the respective circuit courts of appeals designated by order of the
Supreme Court in cases in which the judgments of the circuit courts of appeals
were made final by the act. All other territorial appeals went directly to the Su-
preme Court
By virtue of piecemeal legislation too complicated to examine in detail in this
work (for which reference may be made to FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, Ti. WORK
OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) 267-270) at the present time the following circuit
courts of appeals hear cases coming up from the following teriltories, respectively:
First Circuit-Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.'
Third Circuit-District Court of the Virgin Islands.
Fifth Circuit-U. S. District Court for the District of the Canal Zone.2
Supreme Court of Hawaii.
District Court of the Territory of Alaska.'
1. Certain appeals from these courts go directly to the Supreme Court. See
50 STAT. 752, 753 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 3 49a (1940).
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These changes in the original bill presented by Rogers in the House
were not wrought without extended consideration. They were formulated,
in part, by an active and influential committee of the American Bar Asso-
ciation and drawn up in conference with the Senate Judiciary Committee.7 3
Although several senators still clung to the belief that the circuit riding of
pioneer days should be retained because of its "democratic" influences,7 4
and others75 favored a tripartite division of the Supreme Court, the Evart's
bill prevailed by a vote of 44 to 6 on September 24, 1890,7 after a debate
lasting six days.77
Final passage of the bill was delayed until the next session when, on
February 21, 1891, the- House voted not to concur in the Senate amend-
ments.78 However, the House conferees acceded to the Senate's changes,78
the House voted approval on February 28, 18910 after strenuous opposition
by Rogers because of the amendments to his original bill,8' and on March 3,
1891, the act which created the circuit courts of appeal received the presi-
dent's signature.82
The primary purpose of the Act was to expedite the administration of
justice. A contemporary writer had described the existing condition in
these words,
2. For discussion of the creation of this court and its activities see note (1936)
49 HARv. L. REv. 793; Loring, American Extraterritoriality in China (1926),
10 MINN. L. REv. 407; Lobingier, A Quarter Century of our Extraterritorial
Court (1932) 20 GEo. L. J. 427.
Review of decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands can be had
only in the Supreme Court of the United States, and there only by certiorari in
cases ".. . wherein the Constitution, or any statute or treaty of the United States
is involved, or wherein the value in controversy exceeds $25,000, or wherein the
title or possession of real estate exceeding in value the sum of $25,000 is involved
or brought in question...." 43 STAT. 940 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 349 (1940) (Act
of February 13, 1925). See the Historical Note, 28 U. S. C. § 349 for a judicial
history of the Philippine Islands. See also Kingsbury, Writs of Error and Appeals
from the New Territorial Courts (1907) 16 YALE L. J. 417.
73. See Dent, Report of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Reme-
dial Procedure, (1894) 17 A. B. A. REP. 336, 337.
74. See 21 CONG. REc. 10223-10224, for remarks of Senator Vest of Missouri.
75. See Id. at 8307, for the minority report by Edmunds of the Judicial
Committee favoring the divisional scheme for relieving the Supreme Court.
76. Id. at 10364.
77. Id. at 10193-10194, 10217-10232, 10278-10288, 10302-10318, 10335, 10363-
10365.
78. 22 id. at 3087.
79. Id. at 3535, 3583.
80. Id. at 3587.
81. Id. at 3584-3588.
82. Id. at 3760; 26 STAT. 826 (1891), 28 U. S. C. §§ 212, 543, 544 (1940).
1944]
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a"... a defendant had only to carry his case to the Supreme
Court to be assured of a respite of years before his case could be
even heard, while to the plaintiff, successful in the lower court, the
removal of his cause to the highest tribunal in the land meant a
heart-sickening postponement of' the time when he might reap the
fruits of his victory."I'R
The record discloses that beyond argument the measures taken accom-
plished their purpose.8 4 Appellate litigation which would previously have
gone to the Supreme Court, *to wait for years for final disposition, and which
was by the Act diverted to the circuit courts of appeals, was promply dis-
posed of.8s The immediate reduction in the number of new cases docketed
in the Supreme Court 6 permitted that court to reduce its arrearage from
a high of 1,190 cases at the end of the October term in 1890, to 714 cases
at the same time in 1893, and to 313, in 1897.87
It should be noted that an intermediate appellate court can truly ex-
pedite the final disposition of litigation only where there does not exist
appeal as of right from its, judgments and ,where the relative jurisdiction of
the several courts is well defined. Otherwise, the existence of intermediate
review tends merely to interpose an additional stay in the course of the
suit and much time, both of courts and litigants, may be consumed in
determining the proper court of review.8 a Undoubtedly a certain number
83. Budd, The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (1893) 9 L. Q. REv. 51.
84. "I think it is generally conceded that the court (C. C .A.) have justified
their creation by accomplishing what was expected of them." REP. Aa'r'Y. GEN.
(1897) XV.
85. Former Chief Justice Taft said:
"The Circuit Courts of Appeals worked well. Speaking generally, they were
always abreast of their dockets, and their activity soon removed the 'hump' in the
docket of the Supreme Court." The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the
Act of February 13, 1925 (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 1.
86. During the four years immediately preceding the creation of the circuit
courts of appeals, the average number of new cases annually to come before the
Supreme Court was 536, and in 1890 alone totalled 623. In 1891, during only part
of which the Act was in operation, the number dropped to 379, and in 1892, to
275. See REP. A-rr. GEN. for these years.
87. REP. ATr'y. GEN.
87a. To some degree this objection is inevitably present in any form of court
organization in which some appeals must be taken to one court, others to another.
The system contemplated by the Circuit Court of Appeals Act was not free from
possibility of confusion, as witness the remarks of Chief Justice Taft in McMil-
liam Contracting Company v. Abernethy, 263 U. S. 438, 441, 44 Sup. Ct. 200
(1929), although never as unworkable as many forms of state court organization.
By Act of Sept. 14, 1922, 42 STAT. 837 (1922), Congress provided for transfer to
the proper court instead of dismissal of cases appealed to the wrong court. The
legislation which minimized the appeals which could be taken directly to the Su-
preme Court and which routed more and more litigation through the circuit courts
[Vol. 9
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of new cases coming to the Supreme Court, even before 1925, and a very
substantial proportion since that date, were previously subjected to the
delay of trial in the circuit courts of appeals, but so rigorously has the
Supreme Court applied its rules of policy in granting certiorari that they
constitute a very small percentage of the total number of cases appealed
from the federal nisi prius courts (in this connection we may include,
though with technical inaccuracy, many administrative agencies with the
district courts as "courts" of first impression). This fact, taken in conjunc-
tion with the circumstance that both the Supreme Court and several circuit
courts of appeals are currently abreast of their dockets, makes it apparent
that the institution of the latter courts has served the intended purpose.
This is not to say that the work of the new courts was hailed by a
unanimous chorus of hosannas. No one familiar with American political
history would expect those who had viewed with distrust and alarm the
expansion of federal governmental activity and had on that ground opposed
an organization of the federal courts which would make possible the adjudi-
cation of the increasing litigation by federal sovereignty, to have changed
their views immediately the courts were in operation.88 And from the Act
of appeals, such as Act of Sept. 6, 1916 (39 STAT. 726 (1916), 28 U. S. C. § 344
(1940)) and especially the Judges' Bill of 1925, 43 STAT. 936 (1925), 28 U. S, C.
§§ 225, 875, 227, 344, 48 U. S. C. §§ 645, 864 (1940)- subject only to certiorari from
the Supreme Court, reduced the number of cases which went astray.
88. '"Whether the growing tendency of the Federal Courts to enlarge their
powers may not in the end prove destructive of our system of government and
the liberties of the people, is a question I do not propose to discuss; but it is not
to be forgotten that to clothe any set of men with powers of whose extent they
are to be the sole judges, is of the very essence of despotism. ... The establish-
ment of the Circuit Court of Appeals, enlarged jurisdiction conferred on Circuit
Court by Acts of Congress, and their construction by the Federal Courts of late
years, have tended to transfer to the Federal Courts much of the litigation former-
ly done by State tribunals. This, in my opinion, is to be regretted. I believe that
State tribunals are the best administrators of domestic and local affairs. -... The
cases growing out.., of the War of the Rebellion and the Constitutional Amend-
ments have mostly been disposed of. and if the calendar of the Supreme Court
had been free of continued cases at the time the act creating Circuit Courts of
Appeals was passed, it is probable there would have been no occasion for such
courts. Whether it would not have been better to have devised some scheme to
dispose of pending cases, and left the Supreme Court to dispose of current cases
as they arise, it is now too late to inquire. ... The tendency of our time is to cen-
tralization in all directions, not only in politics, but of capital and in business of
all kinds. The wealth of the country is rapidly passing from the hands of the
many to great corporations and to the hands of a few indviduals. While some
measure was necessary to relieve the Supreme Court of its accumulated business,
it is to be regretted that some other system could not have been devised to relieve
it without creating nine new courts with all their paraphernalia and numerous officers
scattered throughout the United States, which will necessarily tend to increase the
1944]
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of 1789 to date, federal judges have suffered some enmity, in part earned by
abuse of the security and independence given by their life tenure of office,
but more arising from the discharge of their duties according to precedents
established in Washington and with less response to popular pressure of the
time and locality; in other words, from causes inherent in a judiciary whose
jurisdiction was conceived primarily to override local convictions on mat-
ters of national concern and local passions and prejudices in suits affecting
foreign parties."9
Furthermore, there was room for improvement in the law as it stood
after the passage of the Act of 1891. In view of the many divergent schemes
for court reorganization's being promulgated, each of which had its "last-
ditch" adherents, it is doubtful if any complete reorganization could have
been effected in a single bill, and the one actually to become law was not
presented and passed under the most favorable circumstances for legislative
consideration."0 As described by former Chief Justice Taft,
"The parliamentary situation with respect to the bill had been such
that if a measure of that kind was to pass in the last days of the
50th Congress, it had to pass exactly as it was reported by the
business of the Federal Courts, already, in my opinion, quite too expensive.
"What I have said is not intended as an attack upon the Court of Appeals, but
to sound a note of alarm before it is too late against the tendency of the age to
centralization which, if allowed to go on, must sooner or later destroy all local
government, and with it the liberties of the people and the rights of man." Trum-
bull, The United States Circuit Court of Appeals (1892) ILL. S. BAR. ASS'N. 64.
89. It is undoubtedly true that, as charged by the anti-Federalists of con-
stitutional days and by the populist leaders ever since, the federal courts are less
democratic than elective local courts. One is tempted to digress to principles of
jurisprudence and political science. The American tradition could not tolerate the
administration of justice completely divorced from popular will. On the other
hand, we are equally committed to the proposition that "justice," whatever the
word may mean, shall eschew ex post facto law making. The Greek assembly which
condemned Socrates was a highly democratic court, whose jurisdiction and regu-
larity of procedure he himself admitted. All successful government is a compro-
mise of abstract theory, and several systems of court organization in the United
States vary from each other but in degree in attempted reconciliation of con-
flicting ideologies.
The early decision of Swift v. Tyson and its recent repudiation in Erie Ry.
v. Tompkins represent fluctuations in the policy of the Supreme Court on the
necessary federal judicial attitude toward nationalizing the administration of
justice. Althougl the great growth of interstate activity makes a uniform sub-
stantive law more desirable to-day than ever before, the country is more nationally
minded and the position of the federal sovereignty less in need of assertion.
90. It must be remembered that this was long before the "lame duck"
amendment, and that the 50th Congress ended at midnight on March 3, 1891.
Thus the bill became law as the zero hour approached. See Walker, Our National
Judicial System (1912) 75 CENT. L. J. 184, 190.
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Senate Judiciary Committee. It was not, therefore, subjected to as
full and free discussion as was desirable, and was not freed from
gaps and obscurities which more careful consideration would have
avoided. The Supreme Court in its interpretation has had difficulty
in clarifying it.""'
In the first place, the judicial machinery was still cumbersome. The
act creating the circuit courts of appeals had not eliminated the ancient
circuit courts, which in theory at least, continued to share isi prius juris-
diction with the district courts although their limited appellate function
was now completely gone. This resulted in a most confused situation. Not
only were there two theoretically distinct courts serving identical functions,
with unnecessary duplication of court machinery and possible jurisdictional
snares for the unwary or inexperienced litigant who had to choose the correct
forum, but the judicial personnel exercised such a variety of duties as to
make even description of the system difficult.
The district judges held the district courts. The circuit courts could
be held by either circuit judges, justices of the Supreme Court, or district
judges, but in practice the latter presided almost exclusively.0 2 The three
classes of judges were also competent to sit on the circuit courts of appeals,
but as only two circuit judges were provided for each circuit and a three
judge court was contemplated and -normally held, a district judge regularly
91. Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Colrt Under the Act of February
13, 1925 (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 1.
92. "In the year 1908, out of a total of 18,000 days on which Circuit Courts
were held.throughout the United States, the Circuit judges sat in those courts only
2,000 days, or about 11% of the time, while for the remaining 16,000 days the
court was presided over by the district judges. In twenty-two states the Circuit
court was held exclusively by the district judge, and in at least six other states
the total aggregate of days in which this court was held by the circuit judge
would not exceed ten days for each state.
"The Circuit Courts of the United States, therefore, as they exist today, both
in jurisdiction and in personnel of the judges, are wholly different from the courts
created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. They have no appellate jurisdiction. They
are presided over not by a Supreme Court justice, but by a district judge. The
labor of the Circuit Court judges is confined almost exclusively to work in the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, and the rapid expansion of the work of that court will of
necessity in the course of a few years eliminate him entirely as a factor in the per-
formance of his duties as a judge of the Circuit Court.
"Yet, because under existing laws certain exclusive original jurisdiction is
given to the Circuit Courts there is necessarily maintained in every district of
the United States, and in every decision thereof, now seventy-eight in number, the -
complete machinery of a Circuit Court, consisting of court rooms, clerks, dockets,
marshals, and all of the extensive and expensive features of a court organization."
Note, (1911) 14 LAW NoTEs 204.
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sat upon it. The so-called "circuit judges" 3 devoted themselves virtually
exclusively to the work of the circuit courts of appeals and the justices of
the Supreme Court, though each was (and is) nominally assigned to a par-
ticular circuit, rarely, if ever took to the circuit. 4
Almost immediately additional circuit judges were added to certain
circuits' 5 and this tendency continues (there are at least three circuit judges
in every circuit today) as more and more litigation finds its way into the
federal courts.9 6 However, it was not until 1911 that the circuit courts were
93. It is worthy of note that this nomenclature still exists. We have dis-
trict judges, circuit judges, and justices of the Supreme Court, but not "circuit
court of appeals judges." The shifting character of the personnel of the courts was
frequently criticized, but this feature has been retained because of the flexibility
by which greatly varying burdens of litigation may be met. By assignment by
the presiding circuit judge, a circuit judge may sit in district court with same powers.
and limitations of powers as a district judge. He does not thereby become a dis-
trict judge, however. So, by assignment by the presiding circuit judge, a 'district
judge may sit in another district or upon the circuit court of appeals, with the
powers of a circuit judge as to that litigation. The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court may assign district or circuit judges to temporary duty in the district or
circuit courts of another circuit. A few years ago, because of a peculiar local sit-
uation, Judge Patrick Stone, a district judge in Wisconsin (in the seventh circuit)
was assigned by the Chief Justice to sit in the district court in Michigan (in the
sixth circuit) to hear the criminal prosecution of the officers of a number of large
Detroit banks, See 28 U. S. C. § 17 et seq. (9 STAT. 442 (1850), 16 STAT. 44
(1869)).
These situations to-day represent the unusual, and except where a vacancy
in office may exist-or temporary incapacity of the regular judge-the district
courts are held by district judges and the circuit courts of appeals composed of
circuit judges.
94. An exception is found in the case of United States v. Motlow, 10 F. (2d)
657, (C. C. A. 7th, 1926) in which Justice Butler sat in 1926 as a circuit justice in
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and entered an order enlarging the defendants
on bail after two judges of the circuit court of appeals had refused a similar appli-
cation. He sat as a circuit justice and made his order in a cause pending in the
circuit court of appeals. The order which he entered was subject to vacation or
modification by any member of said circuit court of appeals. In other words, the
unique position of a justice of the Supreme Court sitting as a member of the cir-
cuit court of appeals is here illustrated. He is a justice of the Supreme Court, but
eligible to sit as a member of the circuit court of appeals in the circuit to which
he is assigned. When acting in the latter capacity, his authority is the same as
any other member of that court and subject to vacation or modification to the
same extent as the rulng of any other member of the court.
95. The second circuit had been the first to have a third circuit judge. In
1894 a third circuit judge was added to the eighth circuit (28 STAT. 115). The
seventh (28 STAT. 643) and the ninth (28 STAT. 665) circuits each received a third
circuit judge in 1895.
96. The circuit courts of appeals disposed of 403 cases in 1892, and 1388 in
1911. The average for the first decade of their existence was about 760, in the
second decade 1150. The annual business now exceeds three thousand cases.
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abolished " a and their nisi prius function turned over to the district courts,
which became the exclusive federal court of general original jurisdiction.97
The Circuit Court of Appeals Act, by dealing only piecemeal with the
federal judicial machinery, permitted a number of omissions in what should
have been a coordinated code regulating appellate litigation, at least four of
which were conspicuous enough to deserve special mention. The first of
these concerned criminal cases. For the first hundred years of our national
existence there could be no resort to the Supreme Court in these cases, a
surprising circumstance which can be explained only by the fact that crim-
inal jurisdiction has never occupied the same relative importance to civil
jurisdiction in the federal courts as in the state courts, and by the original
expectation that the bulk of the criminal cases would come before a three
judge circuit court, presided over by a justice of the Supreme Court. As sin-
gle district judges came to hold the circuit courts and to exercise final power
in criminal cases, public remonstrance became felt and on February 6,
1889, the Supreme Court was given appellate jurisdiction in all capital
criminal cases where the accused had been convicted. 8 By the Act of 1891
it was provided that such review might be had where the defendant was
accused of a "capital or otherwise infamous crime," a clause which was
interpreted to give the right of appeal to the Supreme Court in all cases
in which "... the accused might be sentenced to imprisonment in a peni-
tentiary, even if the punishment actually imposed (was) a fine only."9  As
the same statute had created intermediate appellate courts (the circuit
courts of appeals) competent to review all convictions for violation of fed-
eral criminal law, it was anomalous so to extend the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and to increase its burdens. After repeated recommenda-
96a. Agitation over the dual system of nisi prus courts was undoubtedly a
prime factor in the movement for a "Judicial Code." See FRANKFURTER AND
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928) 128 et seq. Curiously
enough, however, the commission appointed in 1899 to prepare the code recom-
mended to the Attorney General in 1900 that the circuit courts of appeals be
abolished and the circuit courts be made the intermediate courts of review. See
REP. Ar'y. Gm. (1900) 401.
97. 36 STAT. 1087 (1911), 28 U. S. C. (1940) Section 24 of the Judicial Code
(36 STAT. 1091 (1911)) compiled the jurisdiction of the district courts. By its
main provision in paragraph one, the code granted jurisdiction to the district courts
over "all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity" where there was di-
versity of citizenship or a federal question. It also increased the matter in con-
troversy from $2000 to $3000. Only after 1911 did the district courts become recog-
nized as an important branch of the federal judicial system,
98. 25 STAT. 656 (1889).
99. Chief Justice Fuller, letter to Senator Hoar, 23 CONG. REc. 3285 (1892).
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tions from the attorney general, 100 direct appeal to the Supreme Court by
a defendant was limited to capital cases in 1897,01 and completely abolished
in 1911,102 except in those situations (cases involving the jurisdiction of the
district court, an interpretation of the Constitution, etc.) where direct appeal
was also possible in civil cases. 0 2a Thereafter, a defendant convicted in
a criminal case could appeal to the appropriate circuit court of appeals,
but could obtain further review only by certiorari (or certification).
It will be recalled that the Act of 1891-the Circuit Court of Appeals
Act-still permitted direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the district
or circuit court where the constitutionality of any law of the United States
was in issue. However, the statute conferring a right of appeal to a defend-
ant convicted in certain criminal cases was held 10 3 to deny to the govern-
ment the right to appeal from an acquittal even though the decision of the
single district judge was based on his conclusion of the invalidity of a fed-
eral statute. This holding was ultimately overturned by the Criminal Ap-
peals Act in 1907104 and the government may now appeal directly to the
Supreme Court where the action of the district judge was founded upon his
construction of, or the invalidity of, the statute, or his sustaining a special
plea in bar where the defendant had not been put in jeopardy.
A second notable omission of the Act of 1891 was its failure to provide
for litigation arising in the District of Columbia, which prior to that date
had been considered a federal circuit for purpose of review of decisions of its
supreme court. Even after the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia was established in 1893,105 review of its decisions was not limited to
those situations in which- review might be had of a decision of a circuit
court of appeals, but rather appeal might be taken from the court of appeals
to the Supreme Court under the same circumstances as they might formerly
100. REP. Arr'y. GEN. (1893) XXV; Ibid. (1894) XXIV; Ibid. (1895) 12; Ibid.
(1896) XVII.
101. 29 STAT. 492 (1897).
102. JUDICIAL CODE § 238, 36 STAT. 1157 (1911), 28 U. S. C. 345 (1940).
102a. Curiously, the provisions of the Act of Feb. 6, 1889 (see footnote 98
s.upra) has fiever been repealed and still appears in the UNITED STATES CODE
(Section 681 of Title 18), but must be deemed to have been overruled by the
positive, inconsistent, and later enactment of the JUDICIAL CODE (See footnote
102 .spra).
103. United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310, 12 Sup. Ct. 609 (1892).
104. 34 STAT. 1246 (1907), 18 U. S. C. § 682 (1940) and see 28 U. S. C.
§ 345 (1940). The statute does not permit such appeal by the government as
would place the acquitted defendant in "double jeopardy."
105. 27 STAT. 434 (1893).
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have been taken0 8 from the supreme court of the district. Thus was estab-
lished an intermediate court which was but another stopping place in liti-
gation inevitably bound for the highest court to which the litigants could
take it, which could not relieve the burden of the Supreme Court nor ex-
pedite the ultimate conclusion of controversies arising in the District of
Columbia, and which invited by its jurisdiction litigation of which Supreme
Court review was desired but was unobtainable from any other federal
court in the country.
This situation was also remedied in 1911 by the Judicial Code, which
limited appeal from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to
cases in which ". . . the construction of any law of the United States" was in-
voked,10 7 a phrase which was strictly construed to apply only to congressional
acts of general application and not to purely local laws of the district.""8
Although this action effectively'0 " controlled the volume of litigation ap-
pealed from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, it preserved
a distinction between that court and the several circuit courts of appeals
which was not abolished until the "Judges' Bill" of 1925.110 Since that time
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has occupied a position
in the federal judicial machinery comparable to a Circuit Court of Appeals"'
106. The scope of review in the Supreme Court of the United States of the
cases from the Supreme Court of the District of fcolumbia was the same as that
from the circuit courts of the United States. See REV. STAT. § 705 (1875); D. C.
CODE (1875) § 846; D. C. Code (1894) § 43. With the further limitation by Act
of Feb. 9, 1893, § 8, 27 STAT. 436, that an appeal or writ of error would lie if the
amount in controversy exceeded $5,000.
107. Section 250.
108. American Security and Trust Company v. Commissioners of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, 224 U. S. 491, 32 Sup. Ct. 553 (1912).
109. For the years 1907, 1908, and 1909, the appeals from the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia alone to the Supreme Court averaged twenty-six cases
a year. During the same years, the total appeals (as distinguished from cases
taken on certiorari) from all nine circuit courts of appeals averaged but fifty-seven
cases annually. During this time approximately ten per cent of the work of the
Supreme Court originated in the District of Columbia.
From the enactment of the JUDICIAL CODE in 1911 until the Judges' Bill in 1925,
the appeals from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia averaged about
nine per 'term, being about one-eighth as many as from the combined circuit
courts of appeals. See REP. ATr'y. GEN. for the years named.
110. 43 STAT. 938 (1925). Section 1 of the bill amended Sections 239 and
240 (a) and (c) of the JUDICIAL CODE; Section 13 repealed §§ 250 and 251 of the
CODE.
111. Its chief justice is a member of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges
(50 STAT. 473 (1937), 28 U. S. C. § 218 (1940), 50 STAT. 753 (1937), 28 U. S. C.
§ 17 (1940)) and the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE are equally applicable
to it. (See Rule 81 d).
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except as the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government over the Dis-
trict of Columbia necessitates a broader jurisdiction in the federal courts
sitting there than is permitted the federal. courts in the several states.
In the third place, the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, in providing for
review of judgments and decrees of the district and circuit courts and for
the first time permitting appeal from interlocutory orders, failed to con-
template in sufficient detail the peculiarities of equitable remedies, always
an important branch of federal judicial activity. Appeal was permitted
from final judgments and decrees, and also from interlocutory orders and
decrees "granting or continuing" an injunction, but made no mention of
appeal from interlocutory order or decree (a) "refusing or dissolving" an
injunction or (b) appointing a receiver. The first omission was supplied in
1895112 but even so, appeal might be thwarted by the appointment of a
receiver without granting any injunctive relief. In 1900, Congress provided
appeals from orders appointing or vacating receivers'-' only inadvert-
ently to omit from the Act, which purported to amend the Act of 1891
and to re-enact the Act of 1895 just referred to, the words "refused or
dissolved" of the latter statute, thus undoing the reform achieved in
1895. The matter was finally set to rights in the Judicial Code'14 which
at the same time, abolishing the circuit courts whose receivers had had a
useful geographically extensive jurisdiction, -conferred upon receivers ap-
pointed by the district court jurisdiction throughout the entire circuit
"subject, however, to the disapproval of such order, within thirty days there-
112. 28 STAT. 666 (1895).
113. 31 STAT. 660 (1900).
114. 36 STAT. 129 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 227 (1940), JUDICIAL CODE § 129
reads:
"Where upon a hearing in equity in a district court, or by a judge thereof
in vacation, an injunction shall be granted, continued, refused, or dissolved by
an interlocutory order or decree, or an application to dissolve an injunction shall
be refused, or an interlocutory order or decree shall be made appointing a re-
ceiver, an appeal may be taken from such interlocutory order or decree granting,
continuing, refusing, dissolving, or refusing to dissolve, an injunction, or appoint-
ing a receiver, to the circuit courts of appeals notwithstanding an appeal in such
case might upon final decree under the statutes regulating the same, be taken di-
rectly to the Supreme Court: Provided, That the appeal must be taken within
thirty days from the entry of such order or decree, and it shall take precedence
in the appellate court; and the proceedings in other respects in the court below
shall not be stayed unless otherwise ordered by that court, or the appellate court,
or a judge thereof, during the pendency of such appeal: Provided, however, That
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after, by the circuit court of appeals for such circuit, or by a circuit judge
thereof...."115
Finally, we may note the failure of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act
to deal with suits against the United States. Appeals from the Court of
Claims lay as of right directly to the Supreme Court. The Tucker Act,' 61
which gave to the circuit and district courts jurisdiction concurrent with
the Court of Claims of claims of less than $10,000 and $1,000 respectively,
provided that appeals and writs of error from the former courts should be
taken under the provisions of the United States statutes then in force. As
appeal from the district and circuit courts to the Supreme Court was gen-
erally possible prior to 1891, there was little substantial difference in the
possibilities of review of the decisions of any of the courts in which a claim
might have been brought. After the creation of the circuits courts of ap-
peals, however, a literal application of the generalized wording of the Tucker
Act would have resulted in bringing most appeals from judgments on claims
brought before the district and circuit courts to the new courts, with only
the possibility of reaching the Supreme Court by certiorari, whereas pro-
ceedings instituted in the Court of Claims could still be appealed directly to
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court at first sustained this interpreta-
tion of the law" 7 and several unsuccessful efforts were made in Congress
to effect a more uniform procedure."" Subsequently the Supreme Court
squarely reversed itself'1 9 to hold that the provision for review set forth in
the Tucker Act adopted the practice of that date, which was not affected
by later changes in general appellate practice, and that appeal in these cases
should still lie to the Supreme Court. The uniformity was bought at the
price of increased work for the Supreme Court which could have been
handled as competently and more expeditiously by the lower appellate
courts. At the present time, owing to the provisions of the Act of 1925,20
115. 36 STAT. 1102 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 117 (1940).
116. 24 STAr. 505 (1887).
117. Ogden v. United States, 148 U. S. 390 13 Sup. Ct. 602 (1893).
118. See REP. ATr'y. GEN. (1898) 7; Id. (1899) 61.
119. The express self-reversal did not come until J. Hamer Fritch, Inc. v.
United States, 248 U. S .458, 39 Sup. Ct., 142 (1919) but as early as Chase v. United
States, 155 U. S. 489, 15 Sup. Ct. 174 (1894), and again in Reid v. United States,
211 U. S. 529, 29 Sup. Ct. 181 (1909) the Supreme Court had assumed appellate
jurisdiction without mention of the Ogden case. The Ogden decision had recurrent
favor in 1914 when, in United States v. Buffalo Pitts Company, 234 U. S. 228, 34
Sup. Ct. 840 (1914) the jurisdiction of the circuit court of appeals to entertain
an appeal was recognized.
120. 43 STAT. 939 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 288 (1940).
1944]
25
Evans: Evans: Fifty Years of the United States Circuit
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1944
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
the decisions of both the Court of Claims and the district courts are not
appealable and may be reviewed by the Supreme Court only upon certiorari.
(For exceptions see 28 U. S. C. §§ 288, 345 (1940)).
Despite these defects, the Circuit Court of Appeals Act was effective as
to the great bulk of federal litigation. Twenty years later the Judicial
Code,'2 ' the first attempt in the nation's history to "... . revise and codify
the laws concerning the jurisdiction and practice of the courts of the United
States, including the Judiciary Act"' 1 22 removed some of the imperfections in-
herent in the earlier measure. The "Code," however, was not a complete
codification and in its own terms proposed a significant caveat.12 3 Not in-
frequently a substantive law enacted by Congress contained provisions for
its administration and enforcement affecting the jurisdiction and practice
of the federal courts as to its subject, and these were generally not affected
by the "Code," whose major innovations have been, specifically touched
upon in the preceding paragraphs. 24
The outstanding example of distinctive jurisdictional and procedural
regulations existing apart from the Judicial Code was to be found in the
Bankruptcy Act, which has provided and- controlled such a large part of
the work of all the federal courts as to demand rather extended discussion.
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898122 was the fourth attempt by Congress to
legislate in the bankruptcy field under the power conferred by Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution. Previous laws were passed on April 4, 1800,
August 19, 1841, and March 2, 1867; but owing to serious inherent defects,
the lives of these were limited to three, two and eleven years respectively.120
121. 36 STAT. 1087 (1911), 28 U. S. C. §§ 28 et seq.
122. 30 STAT. 1116 (1899).
123. Section 297 of the JUDICIAL CODE (36 STAT. 1169 (1911)) read in part:
"Also all other Acts and parts of Acts, in so far as they are embraced within
and superseded by this Act, are hereby repealed; the remaining portions thereof
to be and remain in force with the same effect and to the same extent as if this
Act had not been passed." (Italics supplied.)
124. At this time the "jurisdictional amount" for cases brought in the dis-
trict courts was increased from $2000 to $3000. This affected the circuit courts
of appeals only in the volume of litigation permitted to enter the federal court
system.
125. 30 STAT. 544 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 1 et seq. (1940). In the REP. Arr'v.
GEN. (1899) 373 it was stated with reference to the total of over 22,000 voluntary
and involuntary cases that were filed in the first year of the act's operation:
"The amount of business under this law may be best appreciated when it is
remembered that the total number of civil suits in which the United States was
not a party, brought during the past year in the circuit and district courts, is con-
siderably less than one-half the number of bankruptcy cases."
126. REP. Ar'y. GEN. (1899) 373.
[Vol. 9
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Thus, during the twenty years preceding the passage of the 1898 Act, there
had been no uniform bankruptcy law.
The review of interlocutory orders or decrees and final decisions in
bankruptcy under Sections 24 and 25 of the Bankruptcy Act is peculiar in
that only in bankruptcy cases, and then but in certain cases not appealable
as of right, were the circuit courts of appeals given a discretionary review.
In all other cases review of final decisions or interlocutory orders and decrees
of a district court is mandatory. 27
Section 24 of the Act of 1898, which supplied the jurisdiction of the
appellate *courts, reads:
"a. The Supreme Court of the United States, the circuit court of
appeals of the United States, and the supreme courts of the Ter-
ritories ... are hereby invested with appellate jurisdiction of con-
troversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of
bankruptcy from which they have appellate jurisdiction in other
cases. The Supreme Court of the United States shall exercise a like
jurisdiction from the courts of bankruptcy not within any organ-
ized circuit of the United States and from the Supreme Court of
the District of Columbia. ' '128
"b. The several circuit courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction in
equity, either interlocutory or final, to superintend and revise in
matter of law the proceedings of the several inferior courts of bank-
ruptcy within their jurisdiction. ..."
Appeals, as in equity cases, to the circuit courts of appeals were allowed,
by Section 25, in bankruptcy proceedings in three cases only: "(1) from
a judgment adjudging or refusing to adjudge a defendant a bankrupt; (2)
from a judgment granting or denying a discharge; and (3) from a judgment
allowing or rejecting a debt or claim of five hundred dollars or over," if
taken within ten days.
A final decision of a circuit court of appeals "allowing or rejecting a
claim under this Act" could be appealed to the Supreme Court only: "1.
Where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of two thousand dollars,
and the question involved is one which might have been taken on appeal
127. Note the provisions giving to the circuit courts of appeals review over
orders of administrative agencies in 43 STAT. 937 (1925) § 1, 28 U. S. C. §§ 227,
344 (1940).
128. This last sentence was no longer necessary because of the provisions of
the Judges' Bill of 1925, Section 1, providing for review of decisions of various
territorial courts in specified circuit courts of appeals. See note 72 a sutpra Thus
it was repealed by 1926 amendment to the Bankruptcy Act, 44 STAT. 664, 665
(1926), 11 U. S. C. § 47 (1940).
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or writ of error from the highest court of the state to the Supreme Court
of the United States; or
"2. Where some Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States shall
certify that in his opinion the determination of the question or questions
involved in the allowance or rejection of such claim is essential to a uniform
construction of this act throughout the United States." Direct review in
the Supreme Court by certiorari was provided for "pursuant to the pro-
visions of the United States laws now in force or such as may hereafter
be enacted."
This act, and the above sections specifically, were frequently amended
by later congresses as defects appeared in its operation. In the first place,
the flood of bankruptcy litigation in the lower federal courts1 29 was reflected
in the appellate dockets of both the circuit courts of appeals and the Su-
preme Court. Under the review provisions of the act many matters in
bankruptcy had, besides the hearing before the referee and the district
court judge, a hearing before a circuit court of appeals and also before the
Supreme Court.130 It had long been argued, and was so provided by the
Act of January 28, 1915,'3 and again by the Act of 1925,'12 that an appeal
to a circuit court of appeals, with a right of review in the Supreme Court by
a writ of certiorari, was sufficient. Thereafter certification and certiorari
became" the important means of obtaining a review in the Supreme Court of
bankruptcy cases, and appeal the exception. 33
129. Out of 102,299 cases pending in the district court on July 1, 1913, 32,864
were bankruptcy cases, while in 1915 out of 120,208 pending, 37,949 were petitions
in bankruptcy. REP. ATTy. GEN. for named years.
130. H. R. Rep. No. 1182, 63rd Congress, 2d Sess.; reprinted in 52 CONG. REc.
435 (1914).
131. 38 STAT. 803 (1915). Section 4 providing: "That the judgments and
decrees of the circuit courts of appeals in all proceedings and cases arising under
the Bankruptcy Act and in all controversies arising in such proceedings and cases
shall be final; save only that it shall be competent for the Supreme Court to re-
quire by certiorari, upon petition of any party thereto, that the proceeding, case
or controversy be certified to it for review.....
132. Thus Section 25 (b) was impliedly repealed by the Act of Jan. 28, 1915,
Section 4, 38 STAT. 803; and was expressly repealed by the Act of Feb. 13, 1925, 43
STAT. 942, Section 13 repealing "So much of Sections 24 and 25 of the Bankruptcy
Act of July 1, 1898, as regulates the mode of review by the Supreme Court in
the proceedings, controversies, and cases therein named." (11 U. S. C. §§ 47, 48
(1940)).
133. Section 1 of the Judges' Bill which gave the circuit courts of appeals
"appellate and supervisory jurisdiction under Sections 24 and 25 of the Bankruptcy
Act of July 1, 1898" and which relieved the Supreme Court of obligatory jurisdiction
in bankruptcy cases, Section 240 (c), 43 STAT. 939. A litigant might have a direct
right of appeal to the Supreme Court if his case came within Sections 237 (a),
238, or 240 (b) of the JUDICIAL CODE, as amended by the Judges' Bill.
[Vol. 9
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The provisions of the Act of 1926,'4 in so far as they amended the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in bankruptcy litigation served
only to confuse the litigant; and it was not until the Chandler Act of 1938,'
that Sections 24 and 25 of the Bankruptcy Act were clarified. Section 24
of said act now reads:
"(a) The Circuit Courts of Appeals of the United States and the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia . . .
are hereby invested with appellate jurisdiction from the several
courts of bankruptcy in their respective jurisdictions in proceedings
in bankruptcy, either interlocutory or final, and in controversies
arising in proceedings in bankruptcy, to review, affirm, revise, or
reverse, both in matters of law and in matters of fact: Provided,
however, That the jurisdiction upon appeal from a judgment on a
verdict rendered by a jury, shall extend to matters of law only:
Provided further, That when any order, decree, or judgment in-
volves less than $500, an appeal therefrom may be taken only upon
allowance of the appellate court.
"(b) Such appellate jurisdiction shall be exercised by appeal and
in the form and manner of an appeal.
"(c) The Supreme Court of the United States is hereby vested with
jurisdiction to review judgments, decrees, and orders of the Circuit
Courts of Appeals of the United States and the United States Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in proceedings
under this title in accordance with the provisions of the laws of the
United States now in force or such as may hereafter be enacted."
The Chandler Act, in most cases, eliminated the distinction formerly
taken between "proceedings in bankruptcy" and "controversies in bank-
ruptcy proceedings," 38 and gave the circuit courts of appeals a broader
134. 44 STAT. 664, 665 (1926). See also McLaughing, Amendment of the Bank-
ruptcy Act (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 341, 343; Colin, An Analysis of the 1926 Amend-
iment to the Bankruptcy Act (1926) 26 COL. L. REv. 789, 796 for the confusion
resulting from the 1926 amendment.
135. 52 STAT. 854 (1938), 11 U. S. C. (1940) 47, 48.
136. Under former provisions the distinction was important.
"Controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings" related to disputes between
the trustee in bankruptcy and adverse claimants over the right and title of the
bankrupt's estate. "Proceedings" included matters in regard to the administration
and distribution of the estate. The practical effect of this distinction in regard to
the practice on appeal before the circuit courts of appeals is best summarized by
MooRE, BANKRuPTcy MANUAL (1939) 89: "'Controversies' in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, involving disputes which, but for the bankruptcy, would be the subject
of ordinary litigation, could be reviewed by appeal under Section 24 (a) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, (1) as a matter of right, and (2) upon questions of both fact and law.
Ordinary litigation would afford a right of appeal in such cases, and like relief could
hardly be denied in bankruptcy. On the other hand, 'proceedings' in bankruptcy...
19441
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appellate jurisdiction by eliminating discretionary review except "where
any order, decree, or judgment involves less than $500," and perhaps in
cases invblving interlocutory appeals.137
Subdivision (c) of old Section 24 inserted by the 1926 amendment was
rewritten as new Section 25 (a), and provided that appeal must be brought
to the circuit courts of appeals and the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia within thirty days. Despite this short
appeal period the bankruptcy litigation has steadily increased, and during
recent years it has amounted to between forty and fifty per cent of the
entire business of the federal district courts."38
The circuit courts of appeals were fortuitously established. The volume
of litigation in the federal courts which then necessitated a reorganization
of judicial machinery was tremendously increased by two forces which first
began to take effect almost at that date. One was the trend of philosophical
thinking away from laissez-faire in government and toward increased regu-
lation of all forms of personal endeavor. The other was the recognition that
increased population integrated business, social and productive organiza-
tions, and improved methods of transportation and communication re-
quired federal rather than state regulation. Both trends, well established
by 1916, received a tremendous impetus from our participation in the first
World War which even the return to isolationist "normalcy" in post war
years could not abate. The effect of the great depression of the early 1930's
and the efforts of the Roosevelt administration to overcome it and prevent
its recurrence are too recent to require discussion. The business of the
federal courts has steadily grown, up and down the line, and the end is not
in sight.
The Interstate Commerce Act'e 9 became law in 1887, the Sherman Anti-
Trust Law4 0 took effect in 1890, and the various pieces of Granger legis-
lation marked the 1890's, as the circuit courts of appeals came into being.
fell within Section 24 (b) of the Bankruptcy Act, and were appealable (1) only if
allowed in the discretion of the appellate court, and (2) only on questions of law.
It was thought that it would be a source of intolerable delay if every dispute aris-
ing in the administration of a bankruptcy estate should be subject to review upon
questions of fact. There were three exceptional classes of cases provided for in Section
24 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act, however, in which an appeal in 'proceedings' in
bankruptcy could be had as a matter of right, and upon both the facts and law .... "
137. For an extended analysis of this latter problem, see MooRE, BANKRuPTcY
MANuAL (1939) 96-97.
138. REP. Ar'y. GEN. (1935-1941).
139. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. (1940).
140. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. (1940).
(Vol. 9
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In the twenty-year period between the creation of the circuit court of ap-
peals and the adoption of the Judicial Code were enacted the Safety Appli-
ance Act,141 the Lacey Game Act,1 42 the Elkins Act,143 the Animal Quar-
antine Law,'" the Meat Inspection Law,143 the Food and Drugs Act, 46 the
Hours of Service Law, 47 the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 48 the Anti-
Narcotic Act, 49 the Insecticide Act,3 0 and the Mann Act.1 1 The Bank-
ruptcy Act, the most productive of litigation of all, also took effect during
these years.
Not long after the Judicial Code came the Federal Reserve Act, 1 2 the
Federal Trade Commission Act,3 3 the Federal Water Power Act,'-4 the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 5 5 the Grain Futures Act,'38 the Adamson
Act, 3G the Arbitration Act,' s and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.'159 These
statutes created substantive rights or regulations which could- be enforced
in the federal courts. Many of them created administrative boards whose
decisions were reviewable by the circuit courts of appeals, a phenomena
of government which has assumed such proportions that it must be accorded
special and detailed treatment in subsequent chapters. New and compli-
cated tax laws, enacted to finance the cost of the war and retained to sup-
port the growing governmental overhead, required judicial interpretation
141 27 STAT. 531 (1893), 45 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. (1940) as amended by Act
of April 1, 1896, 29 STAT. 85 (1896), 45 U. S. C. § 6 (1940); 32 STAT. 943 (1903)
45 U. S. C. §§ 8, 9, 10 (1940); 36 STAT. 298 (1910), 45 STAT. §§ 16, 11, 12, 13, 14,
and 15.
142. 31 STAT. 187 (1900), 16 U. S C. §§ 701, 395 (1940).
143. 32 STAT. 847 (1903), 49 U. S. C. §§ 41, 42, 43 (1940).
144. 33 STAT. 1264 (1905), 21 U. S. C. §§ 123-126 (1940).
145. 34 STAT. 674 (1906), 21 U. S. C. §§ 71 et seq. (1940).
146. 34 STAT. 768 (1906), 21 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. (1940).
147. 34 STAT. 1415 (1907), 45 U. S. C. §§ 61-64 (1940).
148. 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. §§ 51-58, 28 U. S. C. § 71 (1940).
149. 35 STAT. 614 (1909), 21 U. S. C. §§ 171, 173, 174-177 (1940), as amended
by Act of January 17, 1914, 38 STAT. 275, 21 U. S. C. §§ 171, 173, 174-184 (1940).
150. 36 STAT. 331 (1910), 7 U. S. C. §§ 125-129, 122, 130-134, 121 (1940).
See also Act of March 3, 1905, 33 STAT. 1269, 7 U. S. C. §§ 141-144 (1940) as
amended by Act of August 20, 1912, 37 STAT. 314, 28 U. S. C. § 188 (1940).
151. 36 STAT. 825 (1910), 18 U. S. C. §§ 397-404 (1940).
152. 38 STAT. 251 (1913), 12 U. S. C., c. 3 (1940).
153. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 441-51 (1940).
154. 41 STAT. 1063 (1920), 16 U. S. C. § 792 (1940).
155. 42 STAT. 159 (1921), 7 U. S. C., c. 9 (1940).
156. 42 STAT. 998 (1932), 7 U. S. C. §§ 1 et seq. (1940).
157. 39 STAT. 721 (1916), 45 U. S. C. §§ 65, 66 (1940).
158. 38 STAT. 103 (1913).
159. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §§ 12-27, 381-383, 387-390, 412 (1940).
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and court enforcement. 1 9a And in the meantime, interstate business, which
means increased possibilities of controversy between citizens of different
states, was growing by leaps and bounds.
The court records tell the story baldly. In the fiscal year 1892, the
district and circuit courts disposed of 32,040 cases, with 56,782 pending
trial. In 1912, 46,648 cases were disposed of, with 102,699 pending. By
1925, 159,812 cases were docketed in the district courts. Similar ratios ob-
tained in the circuit courts of appeal. Eight hundred forty-one cases were
docketed in 1892; in 1912, there were 1,241; in 1925, there were 2,156. In
the Supreme Court, in 1892, but 275 new cases were docketed. (The influ-
ence of the circuit courts of appeals was being felt, though the Court was
still in arrears with its work). By 1912, the number had risen to 509, and
by 1925, there were 749-too many even for a valiant court which, despite
an increase in the number of cases disposed of (from 576 in 1912 to 844 in
1925), was badly behind in its docket.160
In the glutted dockets of the district courts a prime source of indiges-
tion was the Volstead Act,16' an experiment which, noble or not in other
aspects, was disastrous as a venture in law enforcement. Chief Justice
Taft, in asserting that the prohibition laws had added at least ten per cent
to the federal court docket, was greatly understating the situation. In 1921,
of the 54,487 criminal cases instituted, 29,114, or well over fifty per cent
arose under the national prohibition act. This figure constituted approx-
imately twenty-eight per cent of the total district court litigation.162 In
succeeding years, the percentages remained fairly constant; only the actual
figures increased. 6 3 Although the primary burden was on the district courts,
which were reduced to the level of police courts in disposing of many of
these cases, a substantial number of prohibition cases reached the circuit
159a. According to the attorney-general, in 1921 taxation and prohibition were
the leading factors in the post-war jump in federal litigation. See REP. ATr'y.
GEN. (1923) 85; Id. (1924) 79.
160. The statistics are gathered from the reports of the attorneys-general for
the years cited.
161. 41 STAT. 305 (1919), enacted to effectuate the provisions of the U. S.
CONsT. AMEND. XVIII.
162. REP. ATr'y. GEN. (1921) 101, 150, 151.
163. In 1922, there were docketed 130,632 cases, 60,722 on the criminal calen-
dar. Of these, 34,984 arose under the prohibition laws, being our 50% of the crim-
inal cases and 28% of the total litigation.
In 1923, 159,812 cases were docketed, with 76,137 on the criminal calendar.
Of these 49,021 arose under the prohibition laws, being 64% of the criminal cases
and 33% of the total litigation .Figures are from REP. ATr'. GEN. for those years.
(Vol. 9
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courts of appeals. 64 An indirect effect upon that court was the frequent
assignment of circuit judges to sit in the district courts in an unsuccessful
effort to keep the trial courts abreast of their dockets.
Already piecemeal efforts had been made to relieve the Supreme Court,
again falling behind its docket and its time and energies diverted from ex-
clusive consideration of issues of national policy and uniform law admin-
istration which, as the single highest court, it is peculiarly equipped to
handle. The Circuit Court of Appeals Act had partially breached the prif-
ciple of universal right of appeal to the highest court, but Congress would
not trust the untried courts with final jurisdiction in all cases. As experi-
ence proved their reliability, appeal from additional types of litigation was
prohibited, and review by certiorari only was substituted. In 1915 Congress
removed the mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
bankruptcy cases' 65 and trademark 68 litigation, at the same time providing
that appeals from the District Court of Puerto Rico should go to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. In 1916 cases arising under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Hours of Service Act, and the Safety
Appliance Act were terminated in the circuit courts of appeals, subject to
review by certiorari. The time limit for application for all forms of review
by the Supreme Court was reduced to three months and the length of the
Supreme Court term was extended.167
The measures taken were inadequate and the Supreme Court was a
year behind its docket in 1924.168 No one was more aware of the situation
than the justices of that Court. Chief Justice Taft tells us:
"The members of the Court, afraid that the docket might become
more congested, brought the matter to the attention of the Judi-
ciary Committees of both Houses of Congress, and it was there
suggested that the Court prepare a bill to help matters. A com-
mittee of the Court was appointed, of which Mr. Justice Day was
Chairman, Mr. Justice Van Devanter and Mr. Justice McReynolds
164. See The Relief of the Federal Courts and the Pay of Federal Judges (1921)
93 CENT. L. J. 255; See also Shelton, Congested Federal Court Dockets (1922)
94 CENT. L. J. 127.
165. 38 S9(9. 803 (1915), 28 U. S. C. §§ 211, 225 (1940).
166. 38 STAT. 804 (1915), 28 U. S. C. § 345 (1940).
167. 39 STAT. 726 (1916), 28 U. S. C. §§ 338, 344, 308, 350 (1940). Six months
was permitted for cases coming from the Philippine Islands.
168. "After thirty-five years (from the creation of the circuit courts of appeals),
however, that Court's business had again grown beyond its capacity, and a hear-
ing could not be had for cases not advanced out of their order until more than
a year after their filing." Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the
Act of February 13, 1925 (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 1, 2.
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were members, and the Chief Justice acted ex officio. Upon the
retirement of Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Justice Van DeVanter became
the Chairman of the Committee. In the pressure of the regular
judicial work, the bill was not fully and satisfactorily formulated
until the last session of the first Congress in the Harding adminis-
tration: Its legislative consideration was delayed by measures re-
garded as more pressing until the last session of the last Con-
gress.' 169
There was more at stake than the relief of an overworked judiciary.
A function of government is to provide prompt and competent adjudica-
tion of civil disputes and criminal prosecutions. If litigation overwhelms
a court system, the remedy is not to reduce the jurisdiction of the courts
where that would deprive the citizens of the country of a proper tribunal.
The close relationship of two distinct problems has sometimes caused their
confusion. Whether there is virtue in having a law suit between citizens of
different states tried in a federal court today, is disputed, but the merits of
that political controversy should be settled independently of the effect of
the policy adopted upon the court system. If it is advisable, as we have
thought, to permit such suits in the federal courts, and it develops that
the judges are thereby overworked and the dockets so crowded as to delay
the disposition of cases or affect proper consideration of their merits, the
remedy is a change in substantive law (to eliminate disputes) if possible,
improvement in adjective law (to expedite trial), more judges or more
courts. Increasing the jurisdictional amount is an appropriate solution only
if it can be shown that controversies involving more than $3,000 require
a federal forum more than cases involving a lesser amount.
The significance of the state of the Supreme Court docket in the early
1920's was that litigants were delayed in the final adjudication of bitterly
fought law suits and the Supreme Court was prevented from concentrating
on the cases most important from a national standpoint. Justice demands
an impartial trial, good government, a competent one. There is no inherent
requirement of either justice or government for a single review of trial court
decisions, let alone a double review, except as concentration of disputes over
interpretation of law in one court-and it is patently impossible for one
court to handle all the nisi prius litigation of the United States-tends
toward national uniformity of decision.
Upon these considerations was based the philosophy of the bill drafted
169. Id. at 2.
[Vol. 9
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by the justices 170 and, with but one significant congressional amendment,
enacted into law.' 7 ' The bill contemplated a complete codification of fed-
eral appellate jurisdiction.1 72 In this it was only partly successful,172a but
in the main it did set up the scheme of organization under which the fed-
eral courts now operate, and a descriptive approach may now be substituted
for the historical report in these pages.
The district courts hold exclusive173 general nisi prius jurisdiction.7 3a
170. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, testifying before the Judiciary Committee
of the House, reported,
"... . more than two thirds of the cases which come to us under an obligatory
jurisdiction-from state courts, Circuit Courts of Appeals, district courts and the
Court of Claims-result in judgments of affirmance by our court, and also a goodly
number are ultimately dismissed for want of prosecution. This, we think, illustrates
that the present statutes are too liberal-that they permit cases to come to us as
of right with no benefit to the litigants or the public. What we learn of the cases
in examining them confirms or emphasizes this conclusion. Of course in proportion
as our attention is engaged with cases of that character it is taken away from
others which present grave questions and need careful consideration." Hearings
before the Judiciary Committee, H. R. REP. No. 8206, 68th CONG., 2nd. Sess. (1934)
113.
The Chief Justice added his word:
"The Supreme Court's function is for the purpose of expounding and stabilizing
principles of law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing upon con-
stitutional questions and other important questions of law for the public benefit.
It is to preserve uniformity of decisions among the intermediate courts of appeals."
Chief Justice Taft in Hearing before the Committee of the Judiciary H. R. REP. No.
10479, 67th Cong. 2d Sess. (1922).
171. 43 STAT. 936 (1925), 11 U. S. C. §§ 47, 448, 28 U. S. C. 225 etc.
172. Mr. Justice Van Devanter stated:
"What it (the act) does is to take up all the various statutes dealing with
the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts of appeals.and the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme Court, to bring them together and restate the law on the
subject, to make the various provisions harmonious, and to eliminate some of the
obligatory jurisdiction now existing in the Supreme Court, to transfer some that
now exist to the circuit courts of appeals, and to enlarge the discretionary juris-
diction which the Supreme Court now exercises in petitions for certiorari." Pro-
cedure on Federal Courts. Hearing before Sub-Committee of Committee on
Judiciary, SEN. REP. 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1929).
172a. Even at the time of its enactment, it was said,
"The petitioner today must travel outside the Act of 1925 to ascertain the
full measure of review allotted to these.., courts." Blair, Federal Appellate Pro-
cedure as Affected by tle Act of February 13, 1925 (1925) 25 COL. L. REv. 393.
The observation is even more true today and the litigant uncertain of his pro-
cedure would be well advised to examine not only the 28th Title in the United States
Code, but also any federal statute which might affect his substantive rights, for
procedural and jurisdictional provisions. The National Labor Relations Commis-
sion Act and other relatively unrelated pieces of legislation of the depression era
exemplify the point. .
173. Numerous special tribunals, primarily of an administrative character,
have been created, and over the subjects with which they are concerned the juris-
diction of the district courts has been sharply limited. Decisions of these adminis-
trative agencies may be "reviewed" by the circuit courts of appeals. In one sense,
as to such matters the circuit court of appeals is exercising original jurisdiction, since
it is the first "court" to entertain them, but their function is altogether appellate
in examining the record for errors of law.
173a. Its appellate jurisdiction is insignificant. See 28 U. S. C. § 49 (1940).
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The court is held by a single judge except in (1) suits brought by the
United States under the Anti-trust or interstate commerce laws;17 4 (2) suits
to enjoin the enforcement of a state statute or order of a state administra-
tive board or commission;' 7 5 (3) suits to enjoin the enforcement of an act
of congress; 178 (4) suits to review judgments or decrees in action to enforce,
suspend, or set aside orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission other
than for the payment of money; 77 and (5) cases arising under the Packers
and Stockyards Act, 1 the Shipping Act, 79 the Federal Communications
Act, 80 and the Tennessee Valley Authority Act.' 8' In those situations a
three judge court is held, presided over by a circuit judge or a justice of
the Supreme Court (in practice, exclusively by a circuit judge).
Of the cases heard by a three judge district court, appeal lies directly
to the Supreme Court in the first four classes, and in cases under the Packers
and Stockyards Act in the fifth class. It is apparently thought that the three
judge court, presided over by a circuit judge, offers an opportunity for
deliberate judgment comparable to a circuit court of appeals and at least
in the second and third classes of cases, the public interest makes ultimate
review by the Supreme Court so certain and desirable that the delay and
174. The "three juge district court" was instituted by Act of Feb. 11, 1903, 32
STAT. 823 (1903), 15 U. S. C. § 28, 29, subsequently amended, authorizing the
attorney-general in any equity suit in which the United States is complainant,
brought under the anti-trust or interstate commerce acts to state that the case was
one of public importance in which case it was to be heard before a three judge
court. As the circuit courts were not then abolished, the citation was more con-
fused than ever.
175. 36 STAT. 557 (1910), now Section 266 of the Judicial Code 28 U. S. C.
§ 266 (1940) originally applied to injunctions ". . restraining the enforcement...
of any statute of a State by restraining the action of any officer of such state in the
enforcement.., of such" statute...." This was amended by the Act of March 4,
1913, 37 STAT. 1013 (1913), to apply to injunctions to restrain the enforcement
of orders "made by the Administrative board or commission, acting under and
pursuant to the statutes of such state,..." In 1925 the Section was again amended,
extending the requirement of three judges allowing a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court on the inal hearing on the permanent injunction. 28 U. S. C. § 380 (1940).
176. This class was not contained in the Act of 1925, but was added, with
the right of direct appeal to the Supreme Court, by 50 STAT. 748 (1937), 28 U. S.
C. § 421 (1940).
177. By the Act of Oct. 22, 1913, 38 STAT. 220, 28 U. S. C. § 44, 45a, 47
(1940) which abolished the short lived Commerce Court, it was provided that
there could be a direct appeal from a three judge court granting an interlocutory
injunction restraining the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce.
Commission.
178. 42 STAT. 159 (1921), 7 U. S. C. §§ 181 et seq. (1940).
179. 39 STA-. 738 (1916) 46 U. S. C. § 830 (1940).
180. 48 STAT. 1093 (1934) 47 U. S .C. § 401 (d) and 402 (a) (1940).
181. 48 STAT. 70 (1933), 16 U. S. C. § 831 x (1940).
[Vol. 9
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expense of an intermediate trial would be wasteful.""2 If it is wondered why
actions under certain acts are entitled to trial by a three'judge court, and
not those under equally significant regulatory statutes, bewilderment must
be more pronounced at the arbitrary selection of statutes, suits under which
are directly appealable to the Supreme Court. It would seem that a more
consistent philosophy would be to provide for immediate review by the
circuit courts of appeals of the orders of the administrative commissions
created by the several statutes and a review by the Supreme Court through
writ of certiorari or by certification only.183
In addition, direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the judgment
of a single district judge is permitted as under the Criminal Appeals Act
of 1907,8' and in any suit to which the United States is a party and the
decision is rested upon the unconstitutionality of a federal statute (the
appeal may be taken by any party).185
However uncertainly the line may be drawn, the underlying principle
is clear. Direct appeal may be had to the Supreme Court only where public
interest, independent of, though perhaps incidentally concurring with a liti-
gant's interest, is affected. This procedure is but briefly outlined here, for
it is concerned with omitting the circuit courts of appeals, of which we are
writing. Every other final judgment (since the Rules of Civil Procedure
for the federal district courts have been promulgated by the Supreme Court,
"judgment" includes "decree,") and certain interlocutory orders and judg-
ments'8 6 are appealable as of right within three months to, and only to,
182. Taft, The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court Under the Act of February
3, 1925 (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 1, 6.
183. See Note (1937) 51 HARv. L. REV. 148; Comment (1929) 38 YALE L. J.
955.
184. See note 104, supra, Chief Justice Taft wrote:
"The only writ of error permitted from the Supreme Court to a District Court
is in criminal cases in which the United States has been defeated by a. ruling of
the District Court and where the defendant has not been exposed to jeopardy or
acquitted by a verdict of the jury. The reason for this exception is doubtless in
the need for expedition in securing a final construction of new criminal statutes
by the court of last resort so that the Government and those charged with violat-
ing the new law may have the earliest possible final interpretation of what the
law means and long trials and convictions, which might subsequently be set aside
because of a faulty interpretation of the statute, may be avoided. Expedition and
uniformity in construction are thus the controlling considerations." Taft, supra
note 182 at 6.
185. This was added by 50 STAT. 751 (1937), 28 U. S. C. §§ 401, 349a, 380a,
17 (1940).
186. (1) From interlocutory orders of the district court, or a judge thereof
in vacation, granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving an injunction
(see p. 212 and footnote 114); (2) from certain interlocutory orders creating
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the circuit court of appeals in which the district court sat. This obviously
embraces the great bulk of federal litigation. "7 There is no special jurisdic-
tional limitation, though the court must always be alert to error in the
form of lack of jurisdiction in the court below. To illustrate, if a citizen of
Illinois sues a citizen of Wisconsin for $5,000, which may be recoverable as
a legal possibility, a federal district court in Illinois or Wisconsin has juris-
diction if the defendant is properly served. From a judgment for $2,500
either party may appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit though an action could not have been brought in the district court
for that amount, and the appellate court has jurisdiction. However, if the
action had been one in which only $2,500 had been claimed and judgment
for that amount rendered, it would be the duty of the circuit court of ap-
peals to remand the case, with direction to dismiss for lack of the district
court's jurisdiction, whether or not the point was raised by one of the
litigants (it is assumed that the jurisdictional defect is apparent in the
record) as federal district courts have jurisdiction on "diversity of citizen-
ship" grounds only where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $3000. Even in this situation, the circuit court of appeals has jurisdiction
to correct the error of the district court, but the case must be disposed of
on the jurisdictional error below, not on any possible errors of trial.
From judgments of the circuit courts of appeal, appeal may be taken
to the Supreme Court in but one situation.5"" The Act of 1925 contains
a provision granting a litigant a right of review by writ of error where a
circuit court of appeals invalidated a state statute as contrary to a federal
or terminating receiverships; (3) from an interlocutory decree in admiralty pro-
ceedings, 44 STAT. 233 (1926), 28 U. S. C. § 227 (1940); and (4) from a decree
in a suit for the infringement of letters patent where the decree is final except for
the accounting, 44 STAT. 1261 (1927), 28 U. S. C. § 22 7a (1940). The review of
these circuit court orders and decrees is only by permission of the Supreme Court.
187. To quote Professor (now Judge) Dobie,
"Thus this jurisdiction covers all cases in which diversity of citizenship is the
sole ground of the district courts' jurisdiction; all criminal cases, save in a few
exceptional cases in which writ of error is given to the United States; cases in which
the United States is a party, including claims against the United States brought
in the district court under the Tucker Act with the exception of certain suits
brought by the United States under the anti trust and interstate commerce laws;
habeas corpus; an overwhelming majority of cases involving a Federal question;
admiralty cases; and cases in Bankruptcy." DOIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND
PROCEDURE (1928) 789.
188. Prior to the Act of 1925, according to Chief Justice Taft, there were
fourteen.-See FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1928) 261-262.
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right.18 The justices in their draft had proposed that the circuit courts
should be final arbiters, subject only to review by certiorari in the ultimate
tribunal, in all cases and had eliminated all review as of right of their de-
cisions. The Senate, however, with the belief that the federal courts might be
prejudiced in favor of constitutional claims as against state and local rights
provided for appeal where the constitutional claim had been sustained.
The Senate, thus, intended to put on perfect parity discretionary review
of the decision of the highest state courts and of the circuit courts of ap-
peals.190 A writ of error was allowed from a state decision where a federal
claim had been denied or a state right upheld although attacked on con-
stitutional grounds, and where a circuit court of appeals had denied a state
claim as being contrary to the Constitution. In all other cases review was
by certiorari. The anomaly in this parity is in limiting review to writ of
certiorari from decisions of a court of appeals holding acts of congress un-
constitutional. Surely, if any decision is of nation-wide import and deserv-
ing of review by the Supreme Court, this is it. Perhaps the fact that the
Supreme Court will not often deny a petition for certiorari in such a case
will allay any fears derived from the logical inconsistency contained
therein."'9
This right of appeal is of very narrow scope and the Supreme Court
is limited to examination of the ruling on the validity of the state statute.
"Should the defeated party desire to have the whole case examined on its
merits, he can only secure this by abandoning his right to an appeal or writ
of error and by invoking the discretion of the Supreme Court by applying
for a writ of certiorari.' 92
In other situations review may be had by certification of specific ques-
tions by the circuit court of appeals.1 9 2a Exercise of this prerogative rests
189. 43 STAT. 936, 28 U. S. C. § 347 (1940).
190. Senator Walsh said that Congress thereby "intended to put the two on
a perfect parity, allowing a writ of error from the circuit court of appeals under
conditions exactly the same, except reversed, and allowing a writ of certiorari in
one case as in the other case, so that the two would be entirely harmonious." 66
CONG. REc. (1925) 2923.
191. JUDICIAL CODE § 237 (a) and (b) and 240 (b). Also FRANKFURTER AND
LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) 286 and footnote 118 supra.
192. Taft, supra note 182 at 5.
192a. The Supreme Court usually on certification answers only the question
presented to it, but it can require, upon application of any party or upon its own
motion (See Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States, adopted
Feb. 13, 1939) that the entire record be sent up for its determination as though
the case had come up on appeal. DOBIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE
(1928) 853.
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in the sound discretion of that court, and it is not a matter of right to the
litigant. As might be expected, it has not been extensively used, and the
more important possibility of review lies in application by the aggrieved
litigant to the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari directed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals whose decision is sought to be examined. Unlike writ of
error, the writ of certiorari is granted only in the discretion of the court by
whom it is issued, and the Supreme Court has governed the exercise of its
discretion by the principles already discussed.192b Court statistics indicate
that less than 3.4% of the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals are
actually reviewed by the Supreme Court on certiorari and of these, about
one-half are affirmed. It seems very clear that the circuit courts of appeals
are essentially courts of last resort. Certiorari may issue "either before or
after a judgment or decree" by a circuit court of appeals or the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 93 although in practice it is rarely
issued before final judgment or decree.
While the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of appeals is termed exclu-
sively appellate, 9 4 those courts have an original jurisdiction to issue writs
of nandamus, prohibition, or certiorari to aid, protect, or enforce their ap-
pellate powers. 95 A circuit judge may also issue a writ of habeas corpus as
an original process, but his order must be entered in the records of the dis-
trict court wherein the restraint of liberty complained of is had.90 Other-
wise, however, the courts of appeals can exercise no control, except that
within their appellate power, over district court orders aside from the power
to "revise" in bankruptcy proceedings. 9 7
Formerly the appellate jurisdiction of federal courts might be invoked
either by writ of error or by appeal, where the litigant did not have to rely
upon the court's discretion in issuing writ of certiorari. By statute in 1928108
192b. See Rules of Supreme Court, Rule 38 (5), 306 U. S. 716.
(1939).
193. JUDICIAL CODE, § 240 (2), 43 STAT. 936, 28 U. S. C. § 347 (1940).
194. JUDICIAL CoDE § 117, 36 STAT. 1191, 28 U. S. C. § 212 (1940).
195. 28 U. S. C. 377 (1940). See also Chamber of Commerce v. Federal
Trade Commission, 280 Fed. 45 (1922); United States v. Severens, 71 Fed. 768(1896); Zell v. Judges of Circuit Court, 149 Fed. 86 (1906), aff'd 203 U. S. 577
(1906).
196. 43 STAT. 940 § 6 (1925) amended by 52 STAT. 1232 (1938), 28 U. S.
C. § 463 (1940).
197. See p. 215 supra.
198. 45 STAT. 54 (1928), as amended by 45 STAT. 466 (1928), 28 U. S. C.
§§ 861a, 861b (1940), providing:
"Section 1. That the writ of error in cases, civil and criminal, is abolished. All
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the form of writ of error was abolished and one who seeks review as of right
must do so by appeal.10 9 In substance, however, much of the distinction
between the two is still preserved. At common law, writ of error brought
up for review only the "record proper," and any possibility of re-appraisal
of the evidence for re-determination of the facts was precluded. By the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, re-examination of
facts found by a jury upon conflicting evidence is prohibited, 20 0 so though
review may be in the form of appeal bringing to the appellate court a more
complete record of the proceedings below, in jury cases the court is almost
as limited as if writ of error had been employed.
There are now ten circuits. In general, the numbering runs from
East to West,20 1 but the Tenth Circuit embraces the Rocky Mountain area
and the Ninth, the Pacific coast, for the reason that after the entire country
had been divided into nine circuits, it was found that the eighth circuit was
over-large, and the Tenth Circuit was carved out of it.202 The Court of Ap-
peals of the District of Columbia occupies a position analogous to the circuit
courts of appeals, and within its limited jurisdiction, so far as review of its
decisions by the Supreme Court is concerned, so also does the Court of
Claims. The review of decisions of the insular courts has already been
noted .20
relief which heretofore could be obtained-by writ of error shall hereafter be obtain-
able by appeal.
"Section 2. That statutes regulating the right to a writ of error, defining the
relief which may be had thereon, and prescribing the mode of exercising that right
and of invoking such relief, including the provisions relating to costs, supersedeas,
and mandate, shall be applicable to the appeal which the preceding section sub-
stitutes for a writ of error."
199. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. (1938) Rules 72 and 73.
200. "In suit at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact shall be
otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules
of the common law." U. S. CONsT. AMEND. VII.
201. The several circuits are composed as follows:
First: Me., N. H., Mass., R. I.
Second: N. Y., Conn., Vt.
Third: Pa., Del., N. J.
Fourth: Md., Va., W. Va., N. C., S. C.
Fifth: Tex., La., Miss., Ala., Ga., Fla.
Sixth: Mich., Ohio, Ky., Tenn.
Seventh: Wis., Ill., Ind.
Eighth: Minn., Iowa, Mo., Ark., N. D., S. D., Neb.
Ninth: Wash., Ore., Idaho, Mont., Nev., Cal., Arizona.
Tenth: Wyo., Utah, Colo., Kan., Okla., N. M.
202. 45 STAT. 1346 (1929).
203. See note 72a supra.
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
RESUME
(1) The historical review of the scheme of the federal courts adopted
in 1789, and its growth is set forth to show that the pattern of the United
States circuit court of appeals was determined long before its creation and
long postponed its coming.
(2) The United States circuit court of appeals was created solely to
relieve the Supreme Court, and yet not to modify the central idea of an
integrated judicial system, with the Supreme Court, the only constitutional
court, as its head and all inferior courts created by congress, with the idea
of maintaining this general scheme. The Supreme Court was to maintain
its preeminent position and retain the power which made the Judiciary the
third independent branch of Federal Government.
(3) The United States circuit courts of appeals, created to relieve the
Supreme Court, rather promptly produced radical changes in the entire
judicial system. These changes were (a) the elimination of the U. S. Cir-
cuit Court; (b) a great increase in the jurisdiction and importance of the
United States district court; (c) the displacement in actuality of the Su-
preme Court as the court of last resort in the federal judicial system. In
over 95% of the cases originating in or removed to the federal court, the
circuit court of appeals has become the court of last resort. The Supreme
Court, disposing of less than 5%, limits its intake largely to Government
cases and to cases where validity or constitutionality of federal statutes,
and the application of provisions of the Federal Constitution, are involved.
In civil suits between citizens, the Supreme Court has become the court of
last resort in actual practice in less than 2% of the cases begun in the
federal courts.
(4) The unexpected and extraordinary growth of quasi-judicial boards,
called administrative boards, has increased the importance and the work
of the circuit courts of appeals as appeals from the rulings of many of these
boards,--the Tax Court, the Labor Board, and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion-by pass the United States district court and go directly to the United
States circuit courts of appeals.
(5) The volume of cases heard by the United States circuit courts of
appeals has grown until it annually hears ten times as many cases as are
heard by the Supreme Court. Of necessity, the number of circuit courts of
appeals increased from nine to ten and the total number of circuit judges
has increased from -nine (one for each circuit) to fifty-two. The volumes
of its decisions now outnumber those reported by the Supreme Court and
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is increasing in relative numbers at the rate of ten to one. One of its mis-
fortunes has been the failure to provide a way for the elimination of the
unessential and unimportant opinions from the published volumes contain-
ing its decisions.
(6) The United States district court, with its increase in jurisdiction,
has increased in number of United States district judges from thirteen to
183 (including the District of Columbia). Its heaviest and greatest time-
consuming labor is still over the criminal calendars.
(7) The circuit court of appeals was the child of necessity-not desired,
but born to relieve the Supreme Court of its over-crowded calendars. To
accomplish this, and yet to permit the Supreme Court to sit as the final
federal court of review, the circuit court of appeals became the seven day
a week working court performing the inconspicuous but heavy spade work
for the Supreme Court which, in turn, became,-especially after review by
certiorari instead of appeal relieved it of much of its labor,--a court of lessened
activity but of greater importance, as compared to the seven day circuit
court of appeals court. It is a Sunday court, so to speak, busy, with the
graver and weightier questions, but questions of interest to the public rather
than to the private litigants. Finality of the circuit court of appeals de-
cisions is in the field of private as distinguished from public litigation.
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